Phenomenal Concepts and Phenomenal Knowledge

IntroductionPart I: Phenomenal Knowledge1. What RoboMary Knows, Daniel Dennett, Tufts University2. So This is What it's Like: A Defense of the Ability Hypothesis, Laurence Nemirow, Davis Graham & Stubbs Income Tax, Benefits & Estate Group3. The Knowledge Argument, Diaphanousness, Representationalism, Frank Jackson, Australian National University, British Academy, Australian Academy of the Social Sciences in Australia, and Fand Institut International de Philosophie4. Does Representationalism Undermine the Knowledge Argument?, Torin Atler, The University of Alabama5. What is This Thing You Call Color: Can a Totally Color-Blind Person Know About Color?, Knut Nordby, formerly University of Oslo and Telnor Communications, Research and DevelopmentPart II: Phenomenal Concepts6. What is a Phenomenal Concept?, Janet Levin, University of Southern California7. Phenomenal and Perceptual Concepts, David Papineau, King's College, Cambridge University8. Phenomenal Concepts and the Materialist Constraint, Joseph Levine, The University of Massachusetts at Amherst9. Phenomenal Concepts and the Explanatory Gap, David Chalmers, Australian National University10. Direct Reference and Dancing Qualia, John Hawthorne, Rutgers University11. Property Dualism, Phenomenal Concepts, and the Semantic Premise, Stephen White, Tufts University12. Max Black's Ojbection to Mind-Brain Identity, Ned Block, New York University13. Grasping Phenomenal Properties, Martine Nida-Rumelin, University of Fribourg

Torin Alter is Associate Professor at the University of Alabama.

Sven Walter is Assistant Professor at the University of Bielefeld, Germany.