Smart Regulation Designing Environmental Policy,9780198268574

Smart Regulation Designing Environmental Policy

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Edition: 1st
ISBN13: 9780198268574
ISBN10: 0198268572
Format: Hardcover
Pub. Date: 1999-01-14
Publisher(s): Oxford University Press
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Summary

Drawing from studies in North America, Europe and Australia, the authors show how combinations of policy instruments, tailored to particular environmental goals, will produce more effective and efficient policy outcomes. They also examine how, at a time of fiscal constraint, environmental policy might still be designed in ways that improve outcomes both for the environment and for business.

Author Biography


Neil Gunningham is Director of the Australian Centre for Environmental Law, Australian National University, Canberra. In 1997 he was Visiting and Senior Fulbright Scholar at the Centre for the Study of Law and Society, University of California, Berkley. He was previously a Research Fellow at the American Bar Foundation, Chicago.
Peter Grabosky is Director of Research the Australian Institute of Criminology, Canberra and a Research Fellow at the Australian Centre for Environmental Law. He was previously Russel Sage Fellow in Law and social Science, Yale Law School, Senior Research Fellow, Research School of Social Sciences, Australian National University, and Visiting Professor, Institute of Comparative Law in Japan, Chuo University.

Table of Contents

Table of Abbreviations
xix
PART I: PRACTICE AND POTENTIAL IN ENVIRONMENTAL REGULATION 3(132)
Chapter 1: Introduction
3(34)
Neil Gunningham
Regulation, deregulation, and beyond
5(6)
Building on what we have
11(4)
Towards a successful policy mix
15(5)
The structure of this book
20(2)
How we approached our task: assumptions, evaluation criteria, and methodology
22(15)
The normative basis of our study
22(3)
Evaluation criteria: what we mean by `optimal'
25(6)
Methodology
31(4)
Summing up
35(2)
Chapter 2: Instruments for Environmental Protection
37(56)
Neil Gunningham
Darren Sinclair
Peter Grabosky
Introduction
37(1)
Varieties of regulatory instruments
38(55)
1. Command and control regulation
38(12)
2. Self-regulation
50(6)
3. Voluntarism
56(4)
4. Education and information instruments
60(1)
(i) Education and training
60(2)
(ii) Corporate environmental reports
62(1)
(iii) Community right to know and pollution inventories
63(2)
(iv) Product certification
65(1)
(v) Award schemes
66(3)
5. Economic instruments
69(1)
(i) Property-rights
70(1)
(ii) Market creation
71(4)
(iii) Fiscal instruments and charge systems
75(2)
(iv) Financial instruments
77(1)
(v) Liability instruments
78(1)
(vi) Performance bonds
79(1)
(vii) Deposit refund systems
80(1)
(viii) Removing perverse incentives
80(3)
6. Free market environmentalism
83(5)
7. Conclusion
88(5)
Chapter 3: Parties, Roles, and Interactions
93(42)
Peter Grabosky
Neil Gunningham
Darren Sinclair
1. Third Parties: public interest groups
94(12)
Public interest group-industry interactions
99(2)
Government support for the role of public interest groups
101(3)
Overcoming the shortcomings of public interest group engagement
104(2)
2. Third Parties: commercial
106(17)
Green consumers
107(2)
Buyer-supplier relations
109(4)
Institutional investors
113(2)
Financial institutions
115(3)
Insurance institutions
118(3)
Environmental consultants
121(2)
3. Governing at a distance
123(2)
4. Instrument and institutional interactions
125(7)
A typology of interactions
126(1)
1. Complementary interactions
126(2)
2. `Neutral' interactions
128(1)
3. Counterproductive interactions
129(2)
Challenges for regulatory design
131(1)
5. Conclusion
132(3)
PART II: REDESIGNING REGULATION: A SECTOR SPECIFIC ANALYSIS 135(238)
Chapter 4: The Chemical Industry
137(130)
Neil Gunningham
Introduction
137(1)
The chemical industry and its environmental impact
137(5)
Characteristics of the chemical industry
142(3)
The regulatory environment and its shortcomings
145(7)
Redesigning regulation: towards efficient and effective policy instruments
152(35)
1. Self-regulation and Responsible Care
155(1)
What is Responsible Care?
156(3)
Can Responsible Care deliver smarter regulation?
159(3)
2. Environmental Management Systems (EMSs) and ISO 14001
172(4)
Can ISO 14001 deliver smarter regulation?
176(11)
Towards a broader policy mix
187(54)
Strategies for regulating large chemical companies
189(2)
1. Measuring environmental outcomes under Environmental Management Systems (EMSs)
191(6)
2. Third party oversight
197(8)
3. Broader stakeholder involvement: community participation and dialogue
205(3)
4. Regulating at a distance: government as backstop
208(6)
5. Incentives for enterprise participation in regulatory flexibility
214(9)
Can commercial third parties reinforce the role of regulatory flexibility?
223(1)
Utilizing supply chain pressure
223(4)
Strategies for regulating smaller players
227(6)
The role of private orderings: Responsible Care and product stewardship
233(8)
Broader lessons
241(24)
1. Instrument Ordering: Towards a `two-track' regulatory strategy
241(5)
2. The Limits of `stand alone instruments': towards co-regulation and tripartism
246(2)
3. Surrogate Regulators
248(1)
Potential regulatory surrogates and their roles
249(3)
4. De-centering the state: government as facilitator, catalyst and activator
252(2)
5. Accountability, transparency, and consultation
254(3)
6. Complementary instrument combinations
257(1)
Activation and reinforcement
258(1)
Using combinations which both `push and pull'
259(2)
Enforcement though complementary combinations
261(2)
Counter productive mixes and unintended consequences
263(1)
7. Political acceptability: achieving win-win solutions
264(1)
Conclusion
265(2)
Chapter 5: The Agriculture Industry
267(106)
Peter Grabosky
Neil Gunningham
Section 1: The agricultural industry and its environmental impact
268(5)
Threats to land-based biodiversity
269(3)
Agricultural chemicals: pesticides and fertilizers
272(1)
Section 2: Characteristics of the agriculture industry
273(5)
Special features of biodiversity and agricultural chemical use
275(2)
Implications for policy design
277(1)
Section 3: The regulatory environment and its shortcomings
278(17)
Limitations of current regulatory regimes and obstacles to effective policy design
285(2)
Inappropriate incentives
287(2)
Resistance to regulation and compliance
289(1)
Inadequate regulatory design
290(2)
Failure to facilitate third party action
292(1)
Overview
293(2)
Section 4: Assessing instrument options: toward efficient and effective agricultural policy
295(42)
Information
296(4)
Voluntarism
300(7)
Self-regulation
307(4)
Economic instruments
311(1)
Positive incentives
311(6)
Property-rights and price-based instruments
317(8)
Coercive sanctions
325(5)
The role of precautionary regulation
330(2)
Instrument interactions
332(5)
Section 5: Institutional influences: the role of third parties
337(18)
Commercial institutions, supply side pressure and sustainable agriculture
337(8)
Institutions of finance and insurance
345(1)
Commercial institutions, third parties, and biodiversity
346(3)
The limits of supply-chain pressure and green markets
349(1)
The contributions of environmental interest groups
350(5)
Section 6: Design considerations
355(13)
1. Instrument ordering
355(2)
2. Institutional Mixes: Utilizing third parties
357(2)
3. Economic and structural setting
359(1)
4. Design for precaution
360(2)
5. The first mover problem and moral hazard
362(2)
6. Financially attractive
364(4)
Conclusion
368(5)
PART III: CONCLUSION: `SMART' REGULATION 373(82)
Chapter 6: Designing Environmental Policy
375(80)
Neil Gunningham
Darren Sinclair
Introduction
375(3)
Regulatory design processes
378(9)
Process 1. Identify the desired policy goal(s) and the trade-offs necessary to achieve it
380(2)
Process 2. Identify the unique characteristics of the environmental problem being addressed
382(1)
Process 3. Identify the range of potential regulatory participants and policy instruments
383(2)
Process 4. Identify opportunities for consultation and public participation
385(2)
Regulatory design principles
387(35)
Principle 1. Prefer policy mixes incorporating a broader range of instruments and institutions
387(4)
Principle 2. Prefer less interventionist measures
391(3)
Applying the principle of low interventionism
394(1)
Principle 3. Ascend a dynamic instrument pyramid to the extent necessary to achieve policy goals
395(1)
Building in regulatory responsiveness
396(8)
Instrument sequencing to increase dependability
404(2)
Triggers and buffer zones
406(1)
Circuit breakers
407(1)
Principle 4. Empower participants which are in the best position to act as surrogate regulators
408(1)
Applying the principle of empowerment
409(4)
Principle 5. Maximize opportunities for win-win outcomes
413(1)
Will firms voluntarily go beyond compliance?
414(5)
Moving the goal posts: turning win-lose into win-win
419(3)
Instrument mixes
422(26)
A summary of instrument mixes
426(1)
Inherently complementary combinations
427(1)
Information and all other instruments
427(5)
Voluntarism and command and control regulation
432(1)
Self-regulation and command and control
433(1)
Command and control regulation (or self-regulation) and supply side incentives
434(1)
Command and control (or self-regulation) and broad based economic instruments (which target different aspects of a common problem)
435(1)
Liability rules and command and control (or self-regulation)
435(1)
Broad-based economic instruments and compulsory reporting and monitoring provisions
436(1)
Inherently counterproductive instrument combinations
437(1)
Command and control regulation and broad-based economic instruments (which target the same aspects of a common problem)
438(3)
Self-regulation and broad-based economic instruments
441(1)
Technology based standards and performance based standards
442(1)
Incentive based instruments and liability rules
443(1)
Sequencing instrument combinations
444(1)
Self-regulation and sequential command and control
444(1)
Self-regulation and sequential broad-based economic instruments
445(1)
Combinations where the outcome will be context-specific
446(1)
Multi-instrument mixes
447(1)
Conclusion
448(7)
Selected Bibliography 455(34)
Index 489

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