
Cengage Advantage Books - Ethics : Discovering Right and Wrong
by Pojman, Louis P.; Fieser, James-
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Summary
Table of Contents
Preface | p. xi |
What Is Ethics? | p. 1 |
Ethics and Its Subdivisions | p. 2 |
Morality as Compared with Other Normative Subjects | p. 3 |
Traits of Moral Principles | p. 7 |
Domains of Ethical Assessment | p. 8 |
Conclusion | p. 11 |
For Further Reflection | p. 12 |
For Further Reading | p. 13 |
Ethical Relativism | p. 14 |
Subjective Ethical Relativism | p. 16 |
Conventional Ethical Relativism | p. 18 |
Criticisms of Conventional Ethical Relativism | p. 21 |
Conclusion | p. 27 |
For Further Reflection | p. 28 |
For Further Reading | p. 29 |
Moral Objectivism | p. 30 |
Aquinas's Objectivism and Absolutism | p. 32 |
Moderate Objectivism | p. 38 |
Ethical Situationalism | p. 43 |
Conclusion | p. 44 |
For Further Reflection | p. 45 |
For Further Reading | p. 45 |
Value and the Quest for the Good | p. 46 |
Intrinsic and Instrumental Value | p. 47 |
The Value of Pleasure | p. 50 |
Are Values Objective or Subjective? | p. 53 |
The Relation of Value to Morality | p. 54 |
The Good Life | p. 57 |
Conclusion | p. 61 |
For Further Reflection | p. 62 |
For Further Reading | p. 62 |
Social Contract Theory and the Motive to Be Moral | p. 64 |
Why Does Society Need Moral Rules? | p. 66 |
Why Should I Be Moral? | p. 70 |
Morality, Self-Interest, and Game Theory | p. 72 |
The Motive to Always Be Moral | p. 75 |
Conclusion | p. 78 |
For Further Reflection | p. 79 |
For Further Reading | p. 79 |
Egoism, Self-Interest, and Altruism | p. 81 |
Psychological Egoism | p. 82 |
Ethical Egoism | p. 87 |
Arguments against Ethical Egoism | p. 91 |
Evolution and Altruism | p. 95 |
Conclusion | p. 97 |
For Further Reflection | p. 98 |
For Further Reading | p. 99 |
Utilitarianism | p. 100 |
Classic Utilitarianism | p. 102 |
Act- and Rule-Utilitarianism | p. 105 |
Criticism of Utilitarianism | p. 109 |
Criticism of the Ends Justifying Immoral Means | p. 114 |
Conclusion | p. 118 |
For Further Reflection | p. 119 |
For Further Reading | p. 119 |
Kant and Deontological Theories | p. 121 |
Kant's Influences | p. 122 |
The Categorical Imperative | p. 126 |
Counterexamples to the Principle of the Law of Nature | p. 132 |
Other Formulations of the Categorical Imperative | p. 135 |
The Problem of Exceptionless Rules | p. 138 |
The Problem of Posterity | p. 141 |
Conclusion: A Reconciliation Project | p. 143 |
For Further Reflection | p. 144 |
For Further Reading | p. 145 |
Virtue Theory | p. 146 |
The Nature of Virtue Ethics | p. 147 |
Criticisms of Action-Based Ethics | p. 151 |
Connections between Virtue-Based and Action-Based Ethics | p. 157 |
Conclusion | p. 165 |
For Further Reflection | p. 166 |
For Further Reading | p. 166 |
Gender and Ethics | p. 167 |
Classic Views | p. 169 |
Female Care Ethics | p. 174 |
Four Options Regarding Gender and Ethics | p. 179 |
Conclusion | p. 183 |
For Further Reflection | p. 185 |
For Further Reading | p. 186 |
Religion and Ethics | p. 187 |
Does Morality Depend on Religion? | p. 188 |
Is Religion Irrelevant or Even Contrary to Morality? | p. 193 |
Does Religion Enhance the Moral Life? | p. 198 |
Conclusion | p. 203 |
For Further Reflection | p. 204 |
For Further Reading | p. 205 |
The Fact-Value Problem | p. 206 |
Hume and Moore: The Problem Classically Stated | p. 207 |
Ayer and Emotivism | p. 210 |
Hare and Prescriptivism | p. 214 |
Naturalism and the Fact-Value Problem | p. 221 |
Conclusion | p. 224 |
For Further Reflection | p. 225 |
For Further Reading | p. 226 |
Moral Realism and the Challenge of Skepticism | p. 227 |
Mackie's Moral Skepticism | p. 229 |
Harman's Moral Nihilism | p. 233 |
A Defense of Moral Realism | p. 237 |
Conclusion | p. 240 |
For Further Reflection | p. 241 |
For Further Reading | p. 242 |
Appendix | p. 243 |
Glossary | p. 247 |
Index | p. 251 |
Table of Contents provided by Ingram. All Rights Reserved. |
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