The Democratic Dilemma: Can Citizens Learn What They Need to Know?

by
Format: Hardcover
Pub. Date: 1998-03-13
Publisher(s): Cambridge University Press
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Summary

Voters cannot answer simple survey questions about politics. Legislators cannot recall the details of legislation. Jurors cannot comprehend legal arguments. Observations such as these are plentiful and several generations of pundits and scholars have used these observations to claim that voters, legislators, and jurors are incompetent. Are these claims correct? Do voters, jurors, and legislators who lack political information make bad decisions? In The Democratic Dilemma, Professors Arthur Lupia and Mathew McCubbins explain how citizens make decisions about complex issues. Combining insights from economics, political science, and the cognitive sciences, they seek to develop theories and experiments about learning and choice. They use these tools to identify the requirements for reasoned choice - the choice that a citizen would make if she possessed a certain (perhaps, greater) level of knowledge. The results clarify debates about voter, juror, and legislator competence and also reveal how the design of political institutions affects citizens' abilities to govern themselves effectively.Arthur Lupia is Associate Professor of Political Science at the University of California, San Diego. Mathew D. McCubbins is Professor of Political Science at the University of California, San Diego.

Table of Contents

List of Tables and Figures
ix(2)
Series Editors' Preface xi(2)
Acknowledgments xiii
1 Knowledge and the Foundation of Democracy
1(16)
Democracy, Delegation, and Reasoned Choice
3(1)
A Preview of Our Theory
4(9)
Plan of the Book
13(4)
PART I: THEORY 17(80)
2 How People Learn
17(22)
Attention! This Is How We Learn
21(9)
The Cognitive Stock Market
30(5)
Attention and Connections
35(1)
Conclusion
36(3)
3 How People Learn from Others
39(29)
The Aristotelian Theories of Persuasion
40(3)
Our Theory of Persuasion
43(16)
Dynamic Implications
59(3)
Persuasive Implications
62(2)
Conclusion
64(4)
4 What People Learn from Others
68(11)
The Conditions for Enlightenment
69(1)
The Conditions for Deception
70(4)
Discussion: How We Choose Whom to Believe
74(2)
Conclusion
76(3)
5 Delegation and Democracy
79(18)
The Dilemma of Delegation
80(2)
A Theory of Delegation with Communication
82(7)
What It All Means
89(3)
Conclusion
92(5)
PART II: EXPERIMENTS 97(108)
6 Theory, Predictions, and the Scientific Method
97(4)
7 Laboratory Experiments on Information, Persuasion, and Choice
101(48)
Experimental Design
104(8)
Experiments on Persuasion and Reasoned Choice
112(35)
Conclusion
147(2)
8 Laboratory Experiments on Delegation
149(35)
Experimental Design
150(8)
Experiments on Delegation
158(24)
Conclusion
182(2)
9 A Survey Experiment on the Conditions for Persuasion
184(21)
Description of the Experiment
186(5)
Analysis
191(10)
Conclusion
201(4)
PART III: IMPLICATIONS FOR INSTITUTIONAL DESIGN 205(24)
10 The Institutions of Knowledge
205(1)
Electoral Institutions
206(4)
Legislative Institutions
210(5)
Bureaucratic Institutions
215(8)
Legal Institutions
223(2)
Unenlightening Democratic Institutions
225(2)
Conclusion
227(2)
Afterword 229(4)
APPENDICES 233(28)
Appendix to Chapter 2 233(7)
Appendix to Chapter 3 240(17)
Appendix to Chapter 5 257(4)
References 261(16)
Author Index 277(4)
Subject Index 281

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