Gerhard Schrieber, Bernd Stegemann, Detlef Vogel

Project co-ordinated by the Militargeschichtliches Forschungsamt


Translated from the German by Dean S. McMurray, and Ewald Osers

Translation Editor: P. S. Falla

Introduction
Part I: Political and Military Developments in the Mediterranean Area, 1939-1940 Gerhard Schreiber
I. Mussolini's 'Non-Belligerence'
II. Italy's Entry Into the War
III. The Strategy Dilemma of the Summer and Autumn of 1940: An Alternative or Interim Strategy
IV. Ideas of German Ruling Circles Concerning a Colonial Empire
Part II: Germany, Italy, and South-East Europe: From Political and Economic Hegemony to Military Aggression Gerhard Schreiber
I. Unequal Heirs of the First World War
II. German and Italian Policy Towards the States of South-East Europe
III. Mussolini's Invasion of Greece: The Beginning of the End of Italy's Great-Power Status
Part III: German Intervention in the Balkans Detlef Vogel
I. Germany's Balkan Policy in the Autumn of 1940 and the Spring of 1941
II. From the Coup in Yugoslavia to the Outbreak of War on 6 April 1941
III. The German Attack on Yugoslavia and Greece
IV. The Capture of Crete
Part IV: Politics and Warfare in 1941 Gerhard Schreiber
I. The Anglo-American Association and its Consequences for British Strategy
II. Hitler's Strategic Deliberations in Connection with the Attack on the Soviet Union
Part V: The Italo-German Conduct of the War in the Mediterranean and North Africa Bernd Stegemann
I. The British Take the Offensive in North and East Africa
II. German Intervention and its Effects on the Naval and Air War in the Mediterranean
III. The Reconquest of Cyrenaica and the Failure of the Attacks on Tobruk
IV. The Fighting on the Sollum Front
V. The Naval and Air War in the Mediterranean and Supplies for the North African Theatre
VI. Operation Crusader
Conclusion