An Introduction to Auction Theory

by ;
Format: Paperback
Pub. Date: 2008-08-26
Publisher(s): Oxford University Press
  • Free Shipping Icon

    This Item Qualifies for Free Shipping!*

    *Excludes marketplace orders.

List Price: $77.28

Buy New

Arriving Soon. Will ship when available.
$73.60

Rent Textbook

Select for Price
There was a problem. Please try again later.

Rent Digital

Rent Digital Options
Online:180 Days access
Downloadable:180 Days
$39.65
Online:365 Days access
Downloadable:365 Days
$45.75
Online:1460 Days access
Downloadable:Lifetime Access
$60.99
$44.61

Used Textbook

We're Sorry
Sold Out

How Marketplace Works:

  • This item is offered by an independent seller and not shipped from our warehouse
  • Item details like edition and cover design may differ from our description; see seller's comments before ordering.
  • Sellers much confirm and ship within two business days; otherwise, the order will be cancelled and refunded.
  • Marketplace purchases cannot be returned to eCampus.com. Contact the seller directly for inquiries; if no response within two days, contact customer service.
  • Additional shipping costs apply to Marketplace purchases. Review shipping costs at checkout.

Summary

The practical importance of auction theory is widely recognized. Indeed, economists have been recognized for their contribution to the design of several auction-like mechanisms, such as the U. S. Federal Communications Commission spectrum auctions, the 3G auctions in Europe and beyond, and the auction markets for electricity markets around the world. Moreover, auction theory is now seen as an important component of an economist's training. For example, some of the more celebrated results from the single-object auction theory are now usually taught in advanced undergraduate and first-year graduate courses on the economics of information. The techniques and insights gained from the study of auction theory provide a useful starting point for those who want to venture into the economics of information, mechanism design, and regulatory economics. This book provides a step-by-step, self-contained treatment of the theory of auctions. The aim is to provide an introductory textbook that will allow students and readers with a calculus background to work through all the basic results. Coverage includes: the basic independent-private-model; the effects of introducing correlation in valuations on equilibrium behaviour and the seller's expected revenue; mechanism design; and the theory of multi-object auctions. The paperback edition of the text includes a new chapter which acts as a guide to current developments in auction theory.

Author Biography


Flavio Menezes joined the University of Queensland as a Chair in Economics after more than a decade at the Australian National University, where he was, amongst other responsibilities, the Foundation Director of the Australian Centre of Regulatory Economics. Flavio is also a former part-time Vice President and Senior Consultant with the Regulatory Economics and Public Policy Practice at CRA International in Canberra. Flavio Menezes has published widely in the economics of information and uncertainty. He is regarded as Australasia's leading auction expert. Paulo Monteiro was Associate Professor at Federal University of Rio de Janeiro and then at IMPA (Institute of Pure and Applied Mathematics.) He is presently at the Postgraduate School of Economics of the Getulio Vargas Foundation (FGV-EPGE). Monteiro researches on infinite dimensional general equilibrium theory, mechanism design, and auction theory.

Table of Contents

Introductionp. 1
Preliminariesp. 5
Notationp. 5
Bayesian Nash Equilibriump. 6
Auctions as Gamesp. 9
What is an Auction?p. 9
Auction Typesp. 10
Auction as Bayesian Gamesp. 11
Private Valuesp. 13
The Independent Private Values Modelp. 13
First-price Auctionsp. 14
Second-price Auctionsp. 18
Revenue Equivalencep. 20
Reserve Prices and Entry Feesp. 22
The Correlated Private Values Modelp. 25
Second-price Auctionp. 26
First-price Auctionp. 27
Comparison of Expected Paymentp. 29
The Effect of Risk Aversionp. 32
Revenue Comparisonp. 33
The Discrete Valuation Casep. 34
Exercisesp. 35
Common Valuep. 39
An Example with Independent Signalsp. 40
First-price Auctionp. 40
Second-price Auction Examplep. 42
An Example with Correlated Typesp. 42
First-price Auctionp. 43
Second-price Auctionp. 45
The Symmetric Model with Two Biddersp. 46
Second-price Auctionsp. 50
First-price Auctionsp. 51
Revenue Comparisonp. 54
Exercisesp. 55
Affiliated Valuesp. 57
The General Modelp. 58
Second-price Auctionsp. 63
First-price Auctionsp. 65
English Auctionsp. 67
Expected Revenue Rankingp. 68
The Effects of Risk Aversionp. 70
Exercisesp. 73
Mechanism Designp. 75
The Revelation Principlep. 75
Direct Mechanismsp. 79
Revenue Equivalence and the Optimal Auctionp. 83
Some Extensionsp. 89
Non-monotonic Marginal Valuationp. 89
Correlated Valuesp. 101
Several Objectsp. 115
Common Values Auctionp. 117
Exercisesp. 119
Multiple Objectsp. 121
Sequential Auctionsp. 122
Simultaneous Auctionsp. 124
Discriminatory Auctionsp. 125
Uniform price Auctionsp. 130
Optimal Auctionp. 137
Exercisesp. 143
Probabilityp. 145
Probability Spacesp. 145
Uncountable Sample Space Casep. 147
Random Variablesp. 148
Random Vectors and their Distributionp. 150
Independence of Random Variablesp. 152
The Distribution of the Maximum of Independent Random Variablesp. 152
The Distribution of the Second Highest Valuep. 153
Mean Value of Random Variablesp. 154
Conditional Probabilityp. 156
Differential Equationsp. 159
The Simplest Differential Equationp. 159
Integrating Factorp. 159
Affiliationp. 161
Convexityp. 165
Referencesp. 169
Index of Notationsp. 173
Index of Proper Namesp. 175
Indexp. 177
Table of Contents provided by Ingram. All Rights Reserved.

An electronic version of this book is available through VitalSource.

This book is viewable on PC, Mac, iPhone, iPad, iPod Touch, and most smartphones.

By purchasing, you will be able to view this book online, as well as download it, for the chosen number of days.

Digital License

You are licensing a digital product for a set duration. Durations are set forth in the product description, with "Lifetime" typically meaning five (5) years of online access and permanent download to a supported device. All licenses are non-transferable.

More details can be found here.

A downloadable version of this book is available through the eCampus Reader or compatible Adobe readers.

Applications are available on iOS, Android, PC, Mac, and Windows Mobile platforms.

Please view the compatibility matrix prior to purchase.