An Introduction To Auction Theory,9780199275984

An Introduction To Auction Theory

by ;
ISBN13: 9780199275984
ISBN10: 019927598X
Format: Hardcover
Pub. Date: 2005-01-13
Publisher(s): Oxford University Press
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Summary

The practical importance of auction theory is widely recognized, and auction theory is now an important component of an economist's training.

Author Biography


Professor Flavio Menezes is the Foundation Director of the Australian Centre of Regulatory Economics at the ANU. He has published widely in economics of auctions and is regarded as Australasia's leading auction expert. Flavio Menezes has extensive teaching experience in the areas of game theory, industrial organization, and on the theory of incentives. He has presented seminars and delivered lectures in the Americas, Europe, and the Asia Pacific Region, has lectured to both academic audiences and practitioners, and has rich consulting experience, including advising internationally on a privatisation model for utilities, providing advice on electricity regulatory reform, and reviewing government procurement practices. P. K. Monteiro received his PhD from IMPA in 1988. He has been at several institutions including UFRJ (1989-1993), IMPA (1994-1996, 1998-99), and EPGE-FGV (1999-present). He has been visiting fellow at CORE (1996-1997) and Copenhagen University (1997-1998). Monteiro works in General Equilibrium, Auction Theory, and Non-linear Pricing.

Table of Contents

Introduction
1(4)
Preliminaries
5(8)
Notation
5(1)
Bayesian Nash Equilibrium
6(3)
Auctions as Games
9(4)
What is an Auction?
9(1)
Auction Types
10(1)
Auction as Bayesian Games
11(2)
Private Values
13(26)
The Independent Private Values Model
13(12)
First-price Auctions
14(4)
Second-price Auctions
18(2)
Revenue Equivalence
20(2)
Reserve Prices and Entry Fees
22(3)
The Correlated Private Values Model
25(7)
Second-price Auction
26(1)
First-price Auction
27(2)
Comparison of Expected Payment
29(3)
The Effect of Risk Aversion
32(2)
Revenue Comparison
33(1)
The Discrete Valuation Case
34(1)
Exercises
35(4)
Common Value
39(18)
An Example with Independent Signals
40(2)
First-price Auction
40(2)
Second-price Auction Example
42(1)
An Example with Correlated Types
42(4)
First-price Auction
43(2)
Second-price Auction
45(1)
The Symmetric Model with Two Bidders
46(9)
Second-price Auctions
50(1)
First-price Auctions
51(3)
Revenue Comparison
54(1)
Exercises
55(2)
Affiliated Values
57(18)
The General Model
58(5)
Second-price Auctions
63(2)
First-price Auctions
65(2)
English Auctions
67(1)
Expected Revenue Ranking
68(2)
The Effects of Risk Aversion
70(3)
Exercises
73(2)
Mechanism Design
75(46)
The Revelation Principle
75(4)
Direct Mechanisms
79(4)
Revenue Equivalence and the Optimal Auction
83(6)
Some Extensions
89(30)
Non-monotonic Marginal Valuation
89(12)
Correlated Values
101(14)
Several Objects
115(2)
Common Values Auction
117(2)
Exercises
119(2)
Multiple Objects
121(24)
Sequential Auctions
122(2)
Simultaneous Auctions
124(13)
Discriminatory Auctions
125(5)
Uniform price Auctions
130(7)
Optimal Auction
137(6)
Exercises
143(2)
A Probability
145(14)
A.1 Probability Spaces
145(2)
A.2 Uncountable Sample Space Case
147(1)
A.3 Random Variables
148(2)
A.4 Random Vectors and their Distribution
150(2)
A.5 Independence of Random Variables
152(1)
A.6 The Distribution of the Maximum of Independent Random Variables
152(1)
A.7 The Distribution of the Second Highest Value
153(1)
A.8 Mean Value of Random Variables
154(2)
A.9 Conditional Probability
156(3)
B Differential Equations
159(2)
B.1 The Simplest Differential Equation
159(1)
B.2 Integrating Factor
159(2)
C Affiliation
161(4)
D Convexity
165(4)
References 169(4)
Index of Notations 173(2)
Index of Proper Names 175(2)
Index 177

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