| Introduction |
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1 | (1) |
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1 | (1) |
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2 | (3) |
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5 | (3) |
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Knowledge as the justification of belief and assertion |
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8 | (3) |
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The myth of epistemic transparency |
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11 | (7) |
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18 | (3) |
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21 | (28) |
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21 | (2) |
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Mental states, first-person accessibility, and scepticism |
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23 | (4) |
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27 | (6) |
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Knowing as the most general factive mental state |
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33 | (8) |
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41 | (8) |
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49 | (16) |
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Internalism and externalism |
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49 | (1) |
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Broad and narrow conditions |
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49 | (5) |
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Mental differences between knowing and believing |
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54 | (6) |
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The causal efficacy of knowledge |
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60 | (5) |
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65 | (28) |
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Prime and composite conditions |
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65 | (1) |
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66 | (7) |
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73 | (2) |
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The explanatory value of prime conditions |
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75 | (5) |
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80 | (3) |
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Explanation and correlation coefficients |
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83 | (5) |
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Primeness and the causal order |
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88 | (1) |
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Non-conjunctive decompositions |
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89 | (4) |
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93 | (21) |
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93 | (1) |
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94 | (2) |
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An argument against luminosity |
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96 | (2) |
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98 | (4) |
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102 | (4) |
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106 | (3) |
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109 | (1) |
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110 | (4) |
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114 | (21) |
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114 | (6) |
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120 | (3) |
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123 | (7) |
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130 | (1) |
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Iterated interpersonal knowledge |
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131 | (4) |
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135 | (12) |
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135 | (8) |
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Conditionally Unexpected Examinations |
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143 | (4) |
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147 | (17) |
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147 | (1) |
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Counterfactual sensitivity |
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147 | (3) |
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Counterfactuals and scepticism |
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150 | (2) |
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152 | (4) |
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156 | (5) |
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Sensitivity and broad content |
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161 | (3) |
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164 | (20) |
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164 | (1) |
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Scepticism and the non-symmetry of epistemic accessibility |
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164 | (5) |
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Difference of evidence in good and bad cases |
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169 | (1) |
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An argument for sameness of evidence |
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170 | (3) |
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The phenomenal conception of evidence |
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173 | (1) |
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Sameness of evidence and the sorites |
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174 | (4) |
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The non-transparency of rationality |
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178 | (3) |
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Scepticism without sameness of evidence |
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181 | (3) |
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184 | (25) |
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Knowledge as justifying belief |
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184 | (2) |
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186 | (4) |
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190 | (3) |
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193 | (1) |
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Evidence as propositional |
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194 | (6) |
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Propositional evidence as knowledge |
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200 | (3) |
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203 | (4) |
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Non-pragmatic justification |
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207 | (2) |
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209 | (29) |
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209 | (4) |
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213 | (8) |
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221 | (3) |
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224 | (4) |
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228 | (2) |
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230 | (8) |
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238 | (32) |
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238 | (6) |
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244 | (5) |
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249 | (6) |
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Objections to the knowledge account, and replies |
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255 | (5) |
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260 | (3) |
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263 | (3) |
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266 | (4) |
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270 | (32) |
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270 | (5) |
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Distribution over conjunction |
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275 | (10) |
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Quantification into sentence position |
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285 | (4) |
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289 | (1) |
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290 | (12) |
| Appendix 1 Correlation Coefficients |
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302 | (3) |
| Appendix 2 Counting Iterations of Knowledge |
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305 | (2) |
| Appendix 3 A Formal Model of Slight Insensitivity Almost Everywhere |
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307 | (4) |
| Appendix 4 Iterated Probabilities in Epistemic Logic (Proofs) |
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311 | (5) |
| Appendix 5 A Non-Symmetric Epistemic Model |
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316 | (2) |
| Appendix 6 Distribution over Conjunction |
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318 | (3) |
| Bibliography |
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321 | (12) |
| Index |
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333 | |