| Preface |
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xvii | |
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| Introduction |
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xxi | |
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| Select bibliography |
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lxxiii | |
| Translator's Introduction (Abridged) |
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lxxvii | |
| Foreword to First German Edition, Volume I (1900) |
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1 | (2) |
| Foreword to Second German Edition, Volume I (1913) |
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3 | (6) |
| PROLEGOMENA TO PURE LOGIC Volume I of the German Editions |
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Volume I of the German Editions |
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9 | (2) |
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11 | (1) |
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The controversy regarding the definition of logic and the essential content of its doctrines |
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11 | (1) |
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Necessity of a renewed discussion of questions of principle |
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12 | (1) |
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Disputed questions. The path to be entered |
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13 | (2) |
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Logic as a normative and, in particular, as a practical discipline |
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15 | (13) |
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The theoretical incompleteness of the separate sciences |
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15 | (1) |
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The theoretical completion of the separate sciences by metaphysics and theory of science |
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16 | (1) |
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The possibility and justification of logic as theory of science |
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16 | (3) |
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Continuation. The three most noteworthy peculiarities of grounded validations |
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19 | (2) |
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The relation of these peculiarities to the possibility of science and the theory of science |
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21 | (2) |
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Methodical modes of procedure in the sciences are in part validatory, in part auxiliary devices towards validations |
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23 | (1) |
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The ideas of theory and science as problems of the theory of science |
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24 | (1) |
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Logic or theory of science as normative discipline and as technology |
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25 | (1) |
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Relevant definitions of logic |
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26 | (2) |
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Theoretical disciplines as the foundation of normative disciplines |
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28 | (12) |
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The controversy regarding the practical character of logic |
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28 | (5) |
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The concept of a normative science. The basic standard or principle that gives it unity |
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33 | (4) |
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Normative disciplines and technologies |
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37 | (1) |
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Theoretical disciplines as the foundation of normative disciplines |
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38 | (2) |
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Psychologism, its arguments and its attitude to the usual counter-arguments |
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40 | (6) |
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The disputed question as to whether the essential theoretical foundations of normative logic lie in psychology |
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40 | (1) |
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The line of proof of the psychologistic thinkers |
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41 | (1) |
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The usual arguments of the opposition and the psychologistic rejoinder |
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41 | (3) |
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A gap in the psychologistic line of proof |
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44 | (2) |
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Empiricistic consequences of psychologism |
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46 | (10) |
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Characterizing two empiricistic consequences of the psychologistic standpoint, and their refutation |
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46 | (2) |
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The laws of thought as supposed laws of nature which operate in isolation as causes of rational thought |
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48 | (3) |
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A third consequence of psychologism, and its refutation |
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51 | (3) |
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54 | (2) |
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Psychological interpretations of basic logical principles |
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56 | (14) |
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The law of contradiction in the psychologistic interpretation of Mill and Spencer |
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56 | (2) |
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Mill's psychological interpretation of the principle yields no law, but a wholly vague, and scientifically unproven, empirical proposition |
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58 | (3) |
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Appendix to the last two sections: On certain basic defects of empiricism |
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59 | (2) |
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Analogous objections against remaining psychological interpretations of our logical principle. Ambiguities as sources of delusion |
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61 | (3) |
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The supposed two-sidedness of the principle of contradiction, in virtue of which it should be taken both as a natural law of thinking, and as a normal law for its logical regulation |
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64 | (3) |
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Continuation. Sigwart's doctrine |
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67 | (3) |
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Syllogistic inferences psychologistically considered. Syllogistic and chemical formulae |
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70 | (5) |
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Attempts at interpreting syllogistic principles psychologically |
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70 | (2) |
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Syllogistic and chemical formulae |
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72 | (3) |
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Psychologism as a sceptical relativism |
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75 | (26) |
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The ideal conditions for the possibility of a theory as such. The strict concept of scepticism |
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75 | (1) |
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Scepticism in the metaphysical sense |
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76 | (1) |
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The concept of relativism and its specific forms |
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77 | (1) |
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Critique of individual relativism |
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78 | (1) |
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Critique of specific relativism and, in particular, of anthropologism |
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78 | (4) |
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General observation. The concept of relativism in an extended sense |
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82 | (1) |
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Psychologism in all its forms is a relativism |
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82 | (1) |
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Anthropologism in Sigwart's Logic |
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83 | (7) |
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Anthropologism in the Logic of B. Erdmann |
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90 | (11) |
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The psychologistic prejudices |
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101 | (22) |
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101 | (2) |
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103 | (3) |
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A look back at the opposed arguments of idealism. Their defects and their justified sense |
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106 | (2) |
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108 | (1) |
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Refutation. Pure mathematics would likewise be made a branch of psychology |
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108 | (1) |
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The research domain of pure logic is, like that of mathematics, an ideal domain |
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109 | (2) |
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Confirmatory indications given by the basic notions of logic and the sense of logical laws |
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111 | (2) |
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113 | (2) |
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Third prejudice. Logic as the theory of evidence |
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115 | (1) |
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Transformation of logical propositions into equivalent propositions about the ideal conditions for the evidence of judgement. The resultant propositions are not psychological |
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116 | (3) |
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The decisive points in this dispute |
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119 | (4) |
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Logic and the principle of the economy of thought |
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123 | (11) |
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123 | (1) |
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The teleological character of the principle of Mach and Avenarius and the scientific meaning of an `economy of thought' (Denkokonomik) |
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123 | (3) |
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Closer treatment of the justified ends of an `economy of thought', in the sphere, mainly, of purely deductive methodology. Its relation to a logical technology |
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126 | (3) |
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The meaninglessness of an economy of thought for pure logic and epistemology, and its relation to psychology |
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129 | (2) |
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Continuation. The uστεpoν πpoτεpoν involved in any foundation of pure logic on an economy of thought |
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131 | (3) |
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End of our critical treatments |
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134 | (10) |
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Queries regarding readily formed misunderstandings of our logical endeavours |
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134 | (1) |
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Our links with great thinkers of the past and, in the first place, with Kant |
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135 | (1) |
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Links with Herbart and Lotze |
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136 | (2) |
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138 | (2) |
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Need for special investigations to provide an epistemological justification and partial realization of the Idea of pure logic |
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140 | (4) |
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Appendix: References to F. A. Lange and B. Bolzano |
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141 | (3) |
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144 | (16) |
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The unity of science. The interconnection of things and the interconnection of truths |
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144 | (2) |
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Continuation. The unity of theory |
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146 | (1) |
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The essential and extra-essential principles that give science unity. Abstract, concrete and normative sciences |
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147 | (2) |
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The question as to the ideal conditions of the possibility of science or of theory in general. The question as it relates to actual knowledge |
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149 | (1) |
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The question as it relates to the content of knowledge |
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150 | (2) |
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The tasks of pure logic. First: the fixing of the pure categories of meaning, and pure categories of objects and their law-governed combinations |
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152 | (2) |
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Secondly: the laws and theories which have their grounds in these categories |
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154 | (1) |
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Thirdly: the theory of the possible forms of theories or the pure theory of manifolds |
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155 | (1) |
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Elucidation of the Idea of a pure theory of manifolds |
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156 | (2) |
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Division of labour. The achievement of the mathematicians and that of the philosophers |
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158 | (2) |
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Broadening of the Idea of pure logic. The pure theory of probability as a pure theory of empirical knowledge |
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160 | |
Other versions by this Author
