Microeconomic Theory
by Mas-Colell, Andreu; Whinston, Michael D.; Green, Jerry R.-
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Summary
Table of Contents
| Individual Decision-Making | |
| Introduction to Part I | |
| Preference and Choice | |
| Introduction | |
| Preference Relations | |
| Choice Rules | |
| The Relationship between Preference Relations and Choice Rules | |
| Exercises | |
| Consumer Choice | |
| Introduction | |
| Commodities | |
| The Consumption Set | |
| Competitive Budgets | |
| Demand Functions and Comparartive Statics | |
| The Weak Axiom of Revealed Preference and the Law of Demand | |
| Exercises | |
| Classical Demand Theory | |
| Introduction | |
| Preference Relations: Basic Properties | |
| Preference and Utility | |
| The Utility Maximization Problem | |
| The Expenditure Minimization Problem | |
| Duality: A Mathematical Introduction | |
| Relationships between Demand, Indirect Utility, and Expenditure Functions | |
| Integrability | |
| Welfare Evaluation of Economic Changes | |
| The Strong Axiom of Revealed Preference | |
| Appendix: Continuity and Differentiability Properties of Walrasian Demand | |
| Exercises | |
| Aggregate Demand | |
| Introduction | |
| Aggregate Demand and Aggregate Wealth | |
| Aggregate Demand and the Weak Axiom | |
| Aggregate Demand and the Existence of a Representative Consumer | |
| Appendix: Regularizing Effects of Aggregation | |
| Exercises | |
| Production | |
| Introduction | |
| Production Sets | |
| Profit Maximization and Cost Minimization | |
| The Geometry of Cost and Supply in the Single Output Case | |
| Aggregation | |
| Efficient Production | |
| Remarks on the Objectives of the Firm | |
| Appendix: The Linear Activity Model | |
| Exercises | |
| Choice under Uncertainty | |
| Introduction | |
| Expected Utility Theory | |
| Money Lotteries and Risk Aversion | |
| Comparison of Payoff Distributions in Terms of Return and Risk | |
| State Dependent Utility | |
| Subjective Probability Theory | |
| Exercises | |
| Game Theory | |
| Introduction to Part II | |
| Basic Elements of Non-Cooperative Games | |
| Introduction | |
| What is a Game? | |
| The Extensive Form Representation of a Game | |
| Strategies and the Normal Form Representation of a Game | |
| Randomized Choices | |
| Exercises | |
| Simultaneous-Move Games | |
| Introduction | |
| Dominant and Dominated Strategies | |
| Rationalizable Strategies | |
| Nash Equilibrium | |
| Games of Incomplete Information: Bayesian Nash Equilibrium | |
| The Possibility of Mistakes: Trembling-Hand Perfection | |
| Appendix: Existence of Nash Equilibrium | |
| Exercises | |
| Dynamic Games | |
| Introduction | |
| Sequential Rationality, Backwards Induction, and Subgame Perfection | |
| Sequential Rationality and Out-of-Equilibrium Beliefs | |
| Reasonable Beliefs, Forward Induction, and Normal Form Refinements | |
| Finite and Infinite Horizon Bilateral Bargaining | |
| Extensive Form Trembling-Hand Perfection | |
| Exercises | |
| Market Equilibrium And Market Failure | |
| Introduction to Part III | |
| Competitive Markets | |
| Introduction | |
| Pareto Optimality and Competitive Equilibria | |
| Partial Equilibrium Competitive Analysis | |
| The Fundamental Welfare Theorems in a Partial Equilibrium Context | |
| Welfare Analysis in the Partial Equilibrium Model | |
| Free-Entry and Long-Run Competitive Equilibria | |
| Concluding Remarks on Partial Equilibrium Analysis | |
| Exercises | |
| Externalities and Public Goods | |
| Introduction | |
| A Simple Bilateral Externality | |
| Public Goods | |
| Multilateral Externalities | |
| Private Information and Second-Best Solutions | |
| Appendix: Non-Convexities and the Theory of Externalities | |
| Exercises | |
| Market Power | |
| Introduction | |
| Monopoly Pricing | |
| Static Models of Oligopoly | |
| Repeated Interaction | |
| Entry | |
| The Competitive Limit | |
| Strategic Precommitments to Affect Future Competition | |
| Infinitely Repeated Games and the Folk Theorem | |
| Strategic Entry Deterrence and Accommodation | |
| Exercises | |
| Adverse Selection, Signalling, and Screening | |
| Introduction | |
| Informational Asymmetries and Adverse Selection | |
| Signalling | |
| Screening | |
| Appendix: Reasonable-Beliefs Refinements in Signalling Games | |
| Exercises | |
| The Principal-Agent Problem | |
| Introduction | |
| Hidden Actions (Moral Hazard) | |
| Hidden Information (and Monopolistic Screening) | |
| Hidden Actions and Hidden Information: Hybrid Models | |
| Multiple Effort Levels in the Hidden Action Model | |
| A Formal Solution of the Principal-Agent Problem with Hidden Information | |
| Exercises | |
| General Equilibrium | |
| Introduction to Part IV | |
| General Equilibrium Theory: Some Examples | |
| Introduction | |
| Pure Exchange: The Edgeworth Box | |
| The One Consumer-One Producer Economy | |
| The 2x2 Production Model | |
| General versus Partial Equilibrium Theory | |
| Exercises | |
| Equilibrium and Its Basic Welfare Properties | |
| Introduction | |
| The Basic Model and Definitions | |
| The First Fundamental Theorem of Welfare Economics | |
| The Second Fundamental Theorem of Welfare Economics | |
| Pareto Optimality and Social Welfare Optima | |
| First-Order Conditions for Pareto Optimality | |
| Some Applications | |
| Appendix: Technical Properties of the Set of Feasible Allocations | |
| Exercises | |
| The Positive Theory of Equilibrium | |
| Introduction | |
| Equilibrium: Definitions and Basic Equations | |
| Existence of Walrasian Equilibrium | |
| Local Uniqueness and the Index Theorem | |
| Anything Goes: The Sonnenschein-Mantel-Debreu Theorem | |
| Uniqueness of Equilibria | |
| Comparative Statics Analysis | |
| Tatonnement Stability | |
| Large Economies and Non-Convexities | |
| Characterizing Equilibrium through Welfare Equations | |
| A General Approach to the Existence of Walrasian Equilibrium | |
| Exercises | |
| Some Foundations for Competitive Equilibria | |
| Introduction | |
| Core and Equilibria | |
| Non-Cooperative Foundations of Walrasian Equilibria | |
| The Limits to Redistribution | |
| Equilibrium and the Marginal Productivity Principle | |
| Appendix: Cooperative Game Theory | |
| Exercises | |
| General Equilibrium under Uncertainty | |
| Introduction | |
| A Market Economy with Contingent Commodities: Description | |
| Arrow-Debreu Equilibrium | |
| Sequential Trade | |
| Asset Markets | |
| Incomplete Markets | |
| Firm Behavior in General Equilibrium Models under Uncertainty | |
| Imperfect Information | |
| Exercises | |
| Equilibrium and Time | |
| Introduction | |
| Intertemporal Utility | |
| Intertemporal Production and Efficiency | |
| Equilibrium: The One-Consumer Case | |
| Stationary Programs, Interest Rates, and Golden Rules | |
| Dynamics | |
| Equilibrium: Several Consumers | |
| Overlapping Generations | |
| Remarks on Non-Equilibrium Dynamics: Tatonnement and Learning | |
| Exercises | |
| Welfare Economics And Incentives | |
| Introduction to Part V | |
| Social Choice Theory | |
| Introduction | |
| A Special Case: Social Preferences over Two Alternatives | |
| The General Case: Arrow's Impossibility Theorem | |
| Some Possibility Results: Restricted Domains | |
| Social Choice Functions | |
| Exercises | |
| Elements of Welfare Economics and Axiomatic Bargaining | |
| Introduction | |
| Utility Possibility Sets | |
| Social Welfare Functions and Social Optima | |
| Invariance Properties of Social Welfare Functions | |
| The Axiomatic Bargaining Approach | |
| Coalitional Bargaining: The Shapley Value | |
| Exercises | |
| Incentives and Mechanism Design | |
| Introduction | |
| The Mechanism Design Problem | |
| Dominant Strategy Implementation | |
| Bayesian Implementation | |
| Participation Constraints | |
| Optimal Bayesian Mechanisms | |
| Implementation and Multiple Equilibria | |
| Implementation in Environments with Complete Information | |
| Exercises | |
| Mathematical Appendix | |
| Introduction | |
| Homogeneous Functions and Euler's Formula | |
| Concave and Quasiconcave Functions | |
| Matrices: Negative (Semi)Definiteness and Other Properties | |
| The Implicit Function Theorem | |
| Continuous Functions and Compact Sets | |
| Convex Sets and Separating Hyperplanes | |
| Correspondences | |
| Fixed Point Theorems | |
| Unconstrained Maximization | |
| Constrained Maximization | |
| The Envelope Theorem | |
| Linear Programming | |
| Dynamic Programming | |
| Table of Contents provided by Publisher. All Rights Reserved. |
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