Philosophy of Mind
by Kim,JaegwonEdition: 3rd
Format: Paperback
Pub. Date: 2010-12-28
Publisher(s): Routledge
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Summary
The philosophy of mind has long been part of the core philosophy curriculum, and this book is the classic, comprehensive survey of the subject. Designed as an introduction to the field for upper-level undergraduates and graduate students,Philosophy of Mindfocuses on the mindbody problem and related issues, some touching on the status of psychology and cognitive science. The third edition has been thoroughly updated throughout to reflect developments of the past decade, and it is the only text of its kind that provides a serious and respectful treatment of substance dualism. This edition also includes two new chapters on the nature of consciousness and the status of consciousness. Improved readability and clarity has been one important aim of the new edition. Throughout the text, author Jaegwon Kim allows readers to come to their own terms with the central problems of the mind. At the same time, Kimrs"s own emerging views are on display and serve to move the discussion forward. Comprehensive, clear, and fair,Philosophy of Mindis a model of philosophical exposition and a significant contribution to the field.
Author Biography
Jaegwon Kim is William Perry Faunce Professor of Philosophy at Brown University. He is the author of Supervenience and Mind; Mind in a Physical World; Physicalism, or Something Near Enough; Essays in the Metaphysics of Mind; and many important papers on the philosophy of mind, metaphysics, epistemology, and the philosophy of science.
Table of Contents
| Preface | p. ix |
| Introduction | p. 1 |
| What Is Philosophy of Mind? | p. 2 |
| Metaphysical Preliminaries | p. 5 |
| Mind-Body Supervenience | p. 8 |
| Materialism and Physicalism | p. 11 |
| Varieties of Mental Phenomena | p. 14 |
| Is There a "Mark of the Mental"? | p. 17 |
| For Further Reading | p. 28 |
| Notes | p. 28 |
| Mind as Immaterial Substance: Descartes's Dualism | p. 31 |
| Descartes's Interactionist Substance Dualism | p. 32 |
| Why Minds and Bodies Are Distinct: Some Arguments | p. 35 |
| Princess Elisabeth Against Descartes | p. 46 |
| The "Pairing Problem": Another Causal Argument | p. 50 |
| Immaterial Minds in Space? | p. 54 |
| Substance Dualism and Property Dualism | p. 56 |
| For Further Reading | p. 58 |
| Notes | p. 58 |
| Mind and Behavior: Behaviorism | p. 61 |
| The Cartesian Theater and the "Beetle in the Box" | p. 63 |
| What Is Behavior? | p. 66 |
| Logical Behaviorism: A Positivist Argument | p. 68 |
| A Behavioral Translation of "Paul Has a Toothache" | p. 70 |
| Difficulties with Behavioral Definitions | p. 71 |
| Do Pains Entail Pain Behavior? | p. 76 |
| Ontological Behaviorism | p. 78 |
| The Real Relationship Between Pain and Pain Behavior | p. 80 |
| Behaviorism in Psychology | p. 82 |
| Why Behavior Matters to Mind | p. 86 |
| For Further Reading | p. 87 |
| Notes | p. 88 |
| Mind as the Brain: The Psychoneural Identity Theory | p. 91 |
| Mind-Brain Correlations | p. 91 |
| Making Sense of Mind-Brain Correlations | p. 93 |
| The Argument from Simplicity | p. 98 |
| Explanatory Arguments for Psychoneural Identity | p. 102 |
| An Argument from Mental Causation | p. 110 |
| Against Psychoneural Identity Theory | p. 114 |
| Reductive and Nonreductive Physicalism | p. 122 |
| For Further Reading | p. 125 |
| Notes | p. 126 |
| Mind as a Computing Machine: Machine Functionalism | p. 129 |
| Multiple Realizability and the Functional Conception of Mind | p. 130 |
| Functional Properties and Their Realizers: Definitions | p. 134 |
| Functionalism and Behaviorism | p. 136 |
| Turing Machines | p. 139 |
| Physical Realizers of Turing Machines | p. 144 |
| Machine Functionalism: Motivations and Claims | p. 147 |
| Machine Functionalism: Further Issues | p. 151 |
| Can Machines Think? The Turing Test | p. 156 |
| Computationalism and the "Chinese Room" | p. 160 |
| For Further Reading | p. 165 |
| Notes | p. 65 |
| Mind as a Causal System: Causal-Theoretical Functionalism | p. 169 |
| The Ramsey-Lewis Method | p. 170 |
| Choosing an Underlying Psychology | p. 172 |
| Functionalism as Physicalism: Psychological Reality | p. 177 |
| Objections and Difficulties | p. 179 |
| Roles Versus Realizers: The Status of Cognitive Science | p. 186 |
| For Further Reading | p. 189 |
| Notes | p. 190 |
| Mental Causation | p. 193 |
| Agency and Mental Causation | p. 195 |
| Mental Causation, Mental Realism, and Epiphenomenalism | p. 197 |
| Psychophysical Laws and "Anomalous Monism" | p. 202 |
| Is Anomalous Monism a Form of Epiphenomenalism? | p. 207 |
| Counterfactuals to the Rescue? | p. 209 |
| Physical Causal Closure and the "Exclusion Argument" | p. 214 |
| The "Supervenience Argument" and Epiphenomenalism | p. 217 |
| Further Issues: The Extrinsicness of Mental States | p. 220 |
| For Further Reading | p. 223 |
| Notes | p. 224 |
| Mental Content | p. 227 |
| Interpretation Theory | p. 228 |
| The Causal-Correlational Approach: Informational Semantics | p. 235 |
| Misrepresentation and the Teleological Approach | p. 239 |
| Narrow Content and Wide Content: Content Externalism | p. 241 |
| The Metaphysics of Wide Content States | p. 248 |
| Is Narrow Content Possible? | p. 251 |
| Two Problems for Content Externalism | p. 254 |
| For Further Reading | p. 258 |
| Notes | p. 259 |
| What Is Consciousness? | p. 263 |
| Some Views on Consciousness | p. 264 |
| Nagel and His Inscrutable Bats | p. 267 |
| Phenomenal Consciousness and Access Consciousness | p. 271 |
| Consciousness and Subjectivity | p. 280 |
| Does Consciousness Involve Higher-Order Perception or Thought? | p. 283 |
| Transparency of Experience and Qualia Representationalism | p. 289 |
| For Further Reading | p. 295 |
| Notes | p. 296 |
| Consciousness and the Mind-Body Problem | p. 301 |
| The "Explanatory Gap" and the "Hard Problem" | p. 302 |
| Does Consciousness Supervene on Physical Properties? | p. 306 |
| Closing the Explanatory Gap: Reduction and Reductive Explanation | p. 311 |
| Functional Analysis and Reductive Explanation | p. 315 |
| Consciousness and Brain Science | p. 317 |
| What Mary, the Supervision Scientist, Didn't Know | p. 323 |
| The Limits of Physicalism | p. 326 |
| For Further Reading | p. 333 |
| Notes | p. 334 |
| References | p. 339 |
| Index | p. 355 |
| Table of Contents provided by Ingram. All Rights Reserved. |
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