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1. Introduction to Phishing. |
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1.2 A Brief History of Phishing. |
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1.3 The Costs to Society of Phishing. |
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1.4 A Typical Phishing Attack. |
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1.4.1 Phishing Example: America’s Credit Unions. |
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1.4.2 Phishing Example: PayPal. |
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1.4.3 Making The Lure Convincing. |
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1.4.5 Making The Hook Convincing. |
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1.4.7 Take Down and Related Technologies. |
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1.5 Evolution of Phishing. |
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1.6 Case Study: Phishing on Froogle. |
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1.7 Protecting Users from Phishing. |
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2. Phishing Attacks: Information Flow and Chokepoints. |
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2.1 Types of Phishing Attacks. |
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2.1.1 Deceptive Phishing. |
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2.1.2 Malware-Based Phishing. |
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2.1.3 DNS-Based Phishing(“Pharming”). |
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2.1.4 Content-Injection Phishing. |
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2.1.5 Man-in-the-Middle Phishing. |
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2.1.6 Search Engine Phishing. |
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2.2 Technology, Chokepoints and Countermeasures. |
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2.2.1 Step 0: Preventing a Phishing Attack Before it Begins. |
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2.2.2 Step 1: Preventing Delivery of Phishing Payload. |
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2.2.3 Step 2: Preventing or Disrupting a User Action. |
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2.2.4 Steps 2 and 4: Prevent Navigation and Data Compromise. |
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2.2.5 Step 3: Preventing Transmission of the Prompt. |
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2.2.6 Step 4: Preventing Transmission of Confidential Information. |
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2.2.7 Steps 4 and 6: Preventing Data Entry and Rendering it Useless. |
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2.2.8 Step 5: Tracing Transmission of Compromised Credentials. |
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2.2.9 Step 6: Interfering with the Use of Compromised Information. |
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2.2.10 Step 7: Interfering with the Financial Benefit. |
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3. Spoofing and Countermeasures. |
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3.1.2 Whitelisting and Greylisting. |
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3.1.3 Anti-spam Proposals. |
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3.2.2 IP Spoofing Prevention. |
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3.2.3 Intra-domain Spoofing. |
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3.3 Homograph attacks using Unicode. |
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3.3.2 Similar Unicode String Generation. |
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3.3.3 Methodology of Homograph Attack Detection. |
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3.4 Simulated Browser Attack. |
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3.4.1 Using the Illusion. |
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3.4.3 SSL and Webspoofing. |
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3.4.4 Ensnaring the User. |
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3.4.5 SpoofGuard vs. the Simulated Browser Attack. |
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3.5 Case Study: Warning the User About Active Web Spoofing. |
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4. Pharming and Client Side Attacks. |
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4.2 Malware Defense Strategies. |
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4.2.1 Defense Against Worms and Viruses . |
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4.2.2 Defense Against Spyware and Keyloggers. |
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4.2.3 Defending Against Rootkits. |
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4.3.2 Role of DNS in Pharming. |
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4.3.3 Defending Against Pharming. |
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4.4 Case Study: Pharming with Appliances. |
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4.4.1 A different phishing strategy. |
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4.4.2 The spoof: a home pharming appliance. |
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4.4.3 Sustainability of distribution in the online marketplace. |
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4.5 Case Study: Race-Pharming. |
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4.5.1 Technical Description. |
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4.5.2 Detection and Counter-Measures. |
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4.5.3 Contrast with DNS Pharming. |
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5. Status Quo Security Tools. |
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5.1 An overview of Anti-Spam Techniques. |
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5.2 Public Key Cryptography and its Infrastructure. |
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5.2.1 Public key Encryption. |
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5.2.2 Digital Signatures. |
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5.2.3 Certificates & Certificate Authorities. |
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5.3.1 Modes Of Authentication. |
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5.3.2 The Handshaking Protocol. |
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5.3.3 SSL in the Browser. |
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5.4.2 Honeypots and the Security Process. |
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5.4.4 Phishing tools and tactics. |
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6. Adding Context to Phishing Attacks: Spear Phishing. |
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6.1 Overview of Context Aware Phishing. |
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6.2 Modeling Phishing Attacks. |
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6.2.1 Stages of Context Aware Attacks. |
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6.2.3 Analysing the General Case. |
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6.2.4 Analysis of One Example Attack. |
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6.2.5 Defenses Against our Example Attacks. |
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6.3 Case Study: Automated Trawling for Public Private Data. |
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6.3.1 Mother’s Maiden Name: Plan of Attack. |
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6.3.2 Availability of Vital Information. |
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6.3.3 Heuristics for MMN Discovery. |
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6.3.4 Experimental Design. |
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6.3.5 Assessing the Damage. |
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6.3.6 Time and Space Heustics. |
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6.3.7 MMN Compromise in Suffixed Children. |
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6.3.8 Other Ways to Derive Mother’s Maiden Names. |
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6.4 Case Study: Using Your Social Network Against You. |
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6.4.1 Motivations of a social phishing attack experiment. |
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6.4.2 Design considerations. |
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6.4.4 Performing the attack. |
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6.4.6 Reactions expressed in experiment blog. |
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6.5 Case Study: Browser Recon Attacks. |
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6.5.1 Who Cares Where I’ve Been? |
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6.5.2 Mining Your History. |
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6.5.3 CSS To Mine History. |
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6.5.5 Various Uses For Browser-Recon. |
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6.5.6 Protecting Against Browser Recon Attacks. |
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6.6 Case Study: Using the Autofill feature in Phishing. |
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6.7 Case Study: Acoustic Keyboard Emanations. |
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6.7.1 Previous Attacks of Acoustic Emanations. |
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6.7.2 Description of Attack. |
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7. Human-Centered Design Considerations. |
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7.1 Introduction: The Human Context of Phishing and Online Security. |
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7.1.2 Browser and Security Protocol Issues in the Human Context. |
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7.1.3 Overview of the HCI and Security Literature. |
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7.2 Understanding and Designing for Users. |
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7.2.1 Understanding Users and Security. |
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7.2.2 Designing Usable Secure Systems. |
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7.3.1 How Does Learning Occur? |
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7.3.3 Learning to Be Phished. |
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7.3.4 Solution Framework. |
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8.1 Traditional Passwords. |
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8.1.1 Cleartext Passwords. |
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8.1.2 Password recycling. |
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8.1.4 Brute force attacks. |
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8.1.5 Dictionary Attacks. |
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8.1.6 Time-Memory Tradeoffs. |
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8.1.9 One-time passwords. |
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8.1.10 Alternatives to passwords. |
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8.2 Case Study: Phishing in Germany. |
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8.2.1 Comparison of Procedures. |
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8.2.2 Recent Changes and New Challenges. |
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8.3 Security Questions as Password Reset Mechanisms. |
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8.3.1 Knowledge Based Authentication. |
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8.3.2 Security Properties of Life Questions. |
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8.3.3 Protocols Using Life Questions. |
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8.4 One-Time Password Tokens. |
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8.4.1 OTPs as a phishing countermeasure. |
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9. Mutual Authentication and Trusted Pathways. |
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9.1 The Need for Reliable Mutual Authentication. |
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9.1.1 Distinctions Between The Physical and Virtual World. |
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9.1.2 The State of Current Mutual Authentication. |
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9.2 Password Authenticated Key Exchange. |
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9.2.1 A Comparison between PAKE and SSL. |
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9.2.2 An Example PAKE Protocol: SPEKE. |
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9.2.3 Other PAKE Protocols and Some Augmented Variations. |
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9.2.4 Doppelganger Attacks on PAKE. |
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9.3 Delayed Password Disclosure. |
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9.3.1 DPD Security Guarantees. |
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9.4 Trusted Path: How To Find Trust in an Unscrupulous World. |
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9.4.1 Trust on the World Wide Web. |
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9.4.2 Trust Model: Extended Conventional Model. |
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9.4.3 Trust Model: Xenophobia. |
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9.4.4 Trust Model: Untrusted Local Computer. |
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9.4.5 Trust Model: Untrusted Recipient. |
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9.4.6 Usability Considerations. |
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9.5 Dynamic Security Skins. |
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9.5.1 Security Properties. |
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9.5.2 Why Phishing Works. |
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9.5.3 Dynamic Security Skins. |
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9.6 Browser Enhancements for Preventing Phishing. |
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9.6.1 Goals for Anti-phishing Techniques. |
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9.6.2 Google Safe Browsing. |
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9.6.3 Phoolproof Phishing Prevention. |
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9.6.4 Final Design of the Two-factor Authentication System. |
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10. Biometrics and Authentication. |
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10.1.1 Fundamentals of Biometric Authentication. |
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10.1.2 Biometrics and Cryptography. |
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10.1.3 Biometrics and Phishing. |
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10.1.4 Phishing Biometric Characteristics. |
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10.2 Hardware Tokens for Authentication and Authorization. |
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10.3 Trusted computing platforms and secure Operating Systems. |
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10.3.1 Protecting Against Information Harvesting. |
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10.3.2 Protecting Against Information Snooping. |
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10.3.3 Protecting Against Redirection. |
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10.4 Secure Dongles and PDAs. |
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10.4.1 The Promise and Problems of PKI. |
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10.4.2 Smart Cards and USB Dongles to Mitigate Risk. |
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10.4.3 PorKI Design and Use. |
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10.4.5 New Applications and Directions. |
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10.5 Cookies for Authentication. |
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10.5.1 Cache-Cookie Memory Management. |
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10.5.2 Cache-cookie memory. |
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10.5.4 TIF-based cache cookies. |
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10.5.5 Schemes for User Identification and Authentication. |
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10.5.7 Rolling-pseudonym scheme. |
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10.5.8 Denial-of-service attacks. |
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10.5.9 Secret cache cookies. |
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10.5.10 Audit Mechanisms. |
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10.5.11 Proprietary identifier-trees. |
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10.6 Lightweight Email Signatures. |
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10.6.1 Cryptographic and System Preliminaries. |
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10.6.2 Lightweight Email Signatures. |
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10.6.3 Technology Adoption. |
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10.6.5 Experimental Results. |
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11. Making Takedown Difficult. |
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11.1 Detection and Takedown. |
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11.1.1 Avoiding Distributed Phishing Attacks - Overview. |
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11.1.2 Collection of candidate phishing emails. |
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11.1.3 Classification of phishing emails. |
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12. Protecting Browser State. |
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12.1 Client-Side Protection of Browser State. |
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12.1.1 Same-Origin Principle. |
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12.1.3 Protecting Visited Links. |
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12.2 Server-Side Protection of Browser State. |
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12.2.2 A Server-side Solution. |
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12.2.4 Translation Policies. |
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12.2.6 Security Argument. |
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12.2.7 Implementation Details. |
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12.2.8 Pseudonyms and Translation. |
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12.2.9 General Considerations. |
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13.1 Browser-Based Anti-Phishing Tools. |
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13.1.1 Information-Oriented Tools. |
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13.1.2 Database-Oriented Tools. |
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13.1.3 Domain-Oriented Tools. |
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13.2 Do Browser Toolbars Actually Prevent Phishing? |
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13.2.2 Results and discussion. |
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14.1 The Role of Trust Online. |
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14.2 Existing Solutions for Securing Trust Online. |
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14.2.1 Reputation Systems and Social Networks. |
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14.2.2 Third Party Certifications. |
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14.2.3 First Party Assertions. |
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14.2.4 Existing Solutions for Securing Trust Online. |
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14.3 Case Study: “Net Trust”. |
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14.3.3 The Security Policy. |
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14.3.4 The Rating System. |
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14.3.5 The Reputation System. |
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14.3.6 Privacy Considerations and Anonymity Models. |
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14.3.7 Usability Study Results. |
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14.4 The Risk of Social Networks. |
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15. Microsoft’s Anti-Phishing Technologies and Tactics. |
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15.1 Cutting The Bait: SmartScreen Detection of Email Spam and Scams. |
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15.2 Cutting The Hook: Dynamic Protection Within the Web Browser. |
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15.3 Prescriptive Guidance and Education for Users. |
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15.4 Ongoing Collaboration, Education and Innovation. |
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16.1 Secure Electronic Mail: A Brief History. |
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16.1.1 The Key Certification Problem. |
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16.1.2 Sending Secure Email: Usability Concerns. |
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16.1.3 The Need to Redirect Focus. |
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16.2 Amazon.com’s Experience with S/MIME. |
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16.2.1 Survey methodology. |
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16.2.2 Awareness of cryptographic capabilities. |
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16.2.3 Segmenting the respondents. |
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16.2.4 Appropriate uses of signing and sealing. |
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16.3 Signatures Without Sealing. |
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16.3.1 Evaluating the usability impact of S/MIME-signed messages. |
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16.3.2 Problems from the field. |
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16.4 Conclusions and Recommendations. |
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16.4.1 Promote incremental deployment. |
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16.4.2 Extending security from the walled garden. |
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16.4.3 S/MIME for Webmail. |
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16.4.4 Improving the S/MIME client. |
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17. Experimental evaluation of attacks and counter-measures. |
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17.1.1 Targets of Behavioral Studies. |
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17.1.2 Techniques of Behavioral Studies for Security. |
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17.1.3 Strategic and Tactical Studies. |
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17.2 Case Study: Attacking eBay Users with Queries. |
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17.2.1 User-to-User Phishing on eBay. |
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17.2.2 eBay Phishing Scenarios. |
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17.2.3 Experiment Design. |
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17.3 Case Study: Signed Applets. |
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17.3.2 Exploiting Applets’ Abilities. |
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17.3.3 Understanding the Potential Impact. |
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17.4 Case Study: Ethically Studying Man in the Middle. |
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17.4.1 Man-in-the-Middle and Phishing. |
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17.4.2 Experiment: Design Goals and Theme. |
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17.4.3 Experiment: Man-in-the-middle technique implementation. |
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17.4.4 Experiment: Participant Preparation. |
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17.4.5 Experiment: Phishing Delivery Method. |
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17.4.6 Experiment: Debriefing. |
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17.4.7 Preliminary Findings. |
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17.5 Legal Considerations in Phishing Research. |
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17.5.1 Specific Federal and State Laws. |
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17.5.2 Contract Law - Business Terms of Use. |
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17.5.3 Potential Tort Liability. |
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17.5.4 The Scope of Risk. |
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17.6 Case Study: Designing and Conducting Phishing Experiments. |
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17.6.1 Ethics and Regulation. |
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17.6.2 Phishing experiments - three case studies. |
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17.6.3 Making it Look Like Phishing. |
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17.6.4 Subject Reactions. |
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17.6.5 The Issue of Timeliness. |
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18. Liability for Phishing. |
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18.2 Obtaining Personal Information. |
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18.2.1 Fraudulent Access. |
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18.2.5 Unfair Trade Practice. |
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18.2.6 Phishing-Specific Legislation. |
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18.3 Exploiting Personal Information. |
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18.3.3 Illegal Computer Access. |
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18.3.4 Trespass to Chattels. |
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