Political Institutions Under Dictatorship

by
Edition: Reprint
Format: Paperback
Pub. Date: 2010-07-26
Publisher(s): Ingram Book Co
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Summary

Often dismissed as window dressing, nominally democratic institutions, such as legislatures and political parties, play an important role in non-democratic regimes. In a comprehensive cross-national study of all non-democratic states from 1946 to 2002 that examines the political uses of these institutions by dictators, Jennifer Gandhi finds that legislative and partisan institutions are an important component in the operation and survival of authoritarian regimes. She examines how and why these institutions are useful to dictatorships in maintaining power. In their efforts to neutralize threats to their power and to solicit cooperation from society, autocratic leaders use these institutions to organize concessions to potential opposition. The use of legislatures and parties to co-opt opposition results in significant institutional effects on policies and outcomes under dictatorship.

Author Biography

Jenifer Gandhi is an assisant professor, in the Department of Political Science at Ernoy University. She received her PhD in comparative politics and political economy from New York University in 2004. Her research interests include the political institutions dictators use to maintain power and the strategies the opposition may adopt in response. Her work has appeared in Economics and Politics and Comparative Political Studies.

Table of Contents

List of Tables and Figuresp. xi
Acknowledgmentsp. xiii
Introductionp. xv
The Argumentp. xvii
The Study of Institutions in Dictatorshipsp. xix
Plan of the Bookp. xxi
The World of Dictatorial Institutionsp. 1
Introductionp. 1
What Is Dictatorship?p. 2
Historical Usagep. 3
Contemporary Controversiesp. 7
Who Are the Dictators?p. 12
Monarchsp. 21
Military Dictatorsp. 25
Civilian Dictatorsp. 29
Operationalization of Dictatorial Typesp. 31
Nominally Democratic Institutionsp. 34
Legislaturesp. 34
Political Partiesp. 36
Conclusionp. 39
Three Illustrative Casesp. 42
Introductionp. 42
Kuwait: Strength without Institutionsp. 44
Sabah Consolidation of Powerp. 44
Merchants and the Push for Institutionsp. 46
The Majlis Movement and the Regime's Responsep. 49
Morocco: Survival with Institutionsp. 52
The Rise of Monarchical and Nationalist Forcesp. 52
Managing State-Building and Oppositionp. 55
The Battle over Institutionsp. 58
Ecuador: The Perils of Noninstitutionalizationp. 61
Prelude to Military Rulep. 61
The Military's Agendap. 64
The Rise of Oppositionp. 66
Underinstitutionalization and Its Consequencesp. 68
Conclusionp. 71
Use of Institutions to Co-optp. 73
Introductionp. 73
Dictatorial Concessionsp. 74
Dictatorial Institutionsp. 77
Actors and Preferencesp. 82
Timingp. 86
Results: Three Equilibriap. 87
Cooperation Equilibriump. 87
Co-optation Equilibriump. 88
Turmoil Equilibriump. 90
Predicting Dictatorial Institutionsp. 92
Datap. 92
Conclusionp. 100
Appendixp. 101
Solutionsp. 101
Comparative Staticsp. 105
Institutions and Policies under Dictatorshipp. 107
Introductionp. 107
Which Policies?p. 110
Civil Libertiesp. 116
Datap. 117
Effect of Institutionsp. 122
Military Expendituresp. 126
Datap. 127
Social Spendingp. 132
Datap. 133
Effect of Institutionsp. 135
Conclusionp. 137
Institutions and Outcomes under Dictatorshipp. 139
Introductionp. 139
Institutional Mechanisms for Economic Developmentp. 142
Alternative Theoretical Frameworksp. 146
Mobilization Power of Single-Party Regimesp. 147
State Autonomyp. 148
Importance of Noninstitutionalized Factorsp. 149
Institutions and Economic Growthp. 150
Model Specificationp. 151
Datap. 152
Effect of Institutions: Results from Random Effects Modelsp. 154
Effect of Institutions: Results from Heckman Selection Modelp. 157
Conclusionp. 160
Institutions and the Survival of Dictatorsp. 163
Introductionp. 163
Managing Political Survivalp. 165
Impact of Institutions on Survivalp. 169
Event History Analysisp. 169
Datap. 171
Impact of Institutions on Survivalp. 175
Conclusionp. 177
Conclusionp. 180
Codebook of Variablesp. 189
Bibliographyp. 195
Author Indexp. 215
Subject Indexp. 221
Table of Contents provided by Ingram. All Rights Reserved.

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