A Theory of the Good and the Right

by
Edition: Revised
Format: Paperback
Pub. Date: 1998-06-01
Publisher(s): Prometheus
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Summary

What system of morals should rational people select as the best for society? Using a contemporary psychological theory of action and of motivation, Richard Brandt's Oxford lectures argue that the purpose of living should be to strive for the greatest good for the largest number of people. Brandt's discussions range from the concept of welfare to conflict between utilitarian moral codes and the dictates of self-interest.

Table of Contents

Part I 1(162)
I. THE STRATEGY OF PRACTICAL CRITICISM
1(23)
1. How to Proceed: Appeal to Linguistic Intuitions?
2(8)
2. A Reforming Definition: Rational Action and the Best Thing to Do
10(6)
3. How to Proceed: Appeal to Ethical Intuitions?
16(8)
II. WANTING AND PLEASURE
24(22)
1. Wants and Aversions (Valence)
25(10)
2. The Pleasant and the Unpleasant
35(7)
3. Some Implications
42(4)
III. THE COGNITIVE THEORY OF ACTION
46(24)
IV. THE CRITICISM OF ACTIONS
70(18)
V. THE PSYCHOLOGY OF PLEASURE AND DESIRES
88(22)
1. Innate and Conditioned Dispositions to Like and Dislike
89(6)
2. Desire and Pleasant Experiences
95(3)
3. Direct Conditioning of Desires
98(2)
4. Other Basic Mechanisms?
100(3)
5. De-Conditioning
103(7)
VI. THE CRITICISM OF PLEASURES AND INTRINSIC DESIRES
110(20)
1. Some Types of `Mistaken' Desires, Aversions, or Pleasures
115(11)
2. Rational Desires and the Concept of the Intrinsically Good
126(4)
VII. SOME RATIONAL PLEASURES AND DESIRES
130(19)
1. Desires for What is Natively Liked
130(2)
2. Pleasure and Ethical Hedonism
132(6)
3. Benevolence
138(11)
VIII. THE FORCE OF KNOWING WHAT IS RATIONAL
149(14)
1. The Force of Knowing What is Rational to Do (Desires Taken as They Are)
152(2)
2. The Force of Knowing What it is Rational to Want
154(6)
3. Should One Act as if One's Desires were Rational?
160(3)
Part II 163(174)
IX. THE CONCEPT OF A MORAL CODE
163(20)
1. The Nature of a Social Moral System
164(12)
2. Moral Codes and Institutional Expectations
176(3)
3. Could a Universal Moral Code be Effective?
179(4)
X. JUSTIFICATION AND THE CONCEPT OF THE MORALLY RIGHT
183(17)
1. The Justification of Moral Codes
183(5)
2. The Concept of Choice of (Tendency to Support) a Moral Code
188(5)
3. The Definition of `Morally Right'
193(3)
4. A Possible Kantian Modification of the Definition
196(4)
XI. RATIONALLY PREFERRED MORAL CODES AND THE GENERAL WELFARE
200(24)
1. An Overview of the Choice Problem
200(3)
2. Types of Valenced Outcome Relevant to Support of a Moral System
203(5)
3. The Irrationality of Some Desires
208(4)
4. The Concept of a Viable Moral System
212(2)
5. Rational Choice and Utilitarianism
214(10)
XII. THREE DIFFERENT DERIVATIONS OF THE RIGHT
224(22)
1. The Ideal Observer Theory
225(4)
2. The Theory of R. M. Hare
229(5)
3. Choice Behind a Veil of Ignorance: the Theory of John Rawls
234(12)
XIII. WELFARE: THE CONCEPT, MEASUREMENT, AND INTERPERSONAL COMPARISONS
246(20)
1. The Objection to Desire Theories
247(6)
2. The Measurement of Happiness
253(4)
3. Interpersonal Comparisons of Enjoyment
257(9)
XIV. THREE MONISTIC MORAL CODES
266(20)
1. Egoism
267(4)
2. Act Utilitarianism
271(7)
3. Utilitarian Generalization
278(8)
XV. THE CONCEPT OF A PLURALISTIC WELFARE-MAXIMIZING MORAL SYSTEM
286(20)
1. The Variable Features of Plural Moral Systems
287(2)
2. The Content of a Welfare-Maximizing Moral System
289(7)
3. Paradoxes for the Plural Ideal-Code Utilitarian?
296(4)
4. A Final Puzzle
300(6)
XVI. JUSTICE, EQUALITY, AND THE MAXIMIZATION OF WELFARE
306(21)
1. The Problem about Justice
306(3)
2. A Welfare-Maximizing Principle about Allocations of Income and Goods
309(2)
3. Why Equal Monetary Income?
311(5)
4. Why Supplements for the Ill and Handicapped?
316(3)
5. Recompense for Services
319(8)
XVII. IS IT ALWAYS RATIONAL TO ACT MORALLY?
327(10)
1. The Concept of Self-Interest
328(3)
2. Would a Rational Person Ever Act Morally Contrary to Self-Interest?
331(6)
REFERENCES 337(18)
INDEX 355

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