| Part I |
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1 | (162) |
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I. THE STRATEGY OF PRACTICAL CRITICISM |
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1 | (23) |
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1. How to Proceed: Appeal to Linguistic Intuitions? |
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2 | (8) |
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2. A Reforming Definition: Rational Action and the Best Thing to Do |
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10 | (6) |
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3. How to Proceed: Appeal to Ethical Intuitions? |
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16 | (8) |
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24 | (22) |
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1. Wants and Aversions (Valence) |
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25 | (10) |
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2. The Pleasant and the Unpleasant |
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35 | (7) |
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42 | (4) |
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III. THE COGNITIVE THEORY OF ACTION |
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46 | (24) |
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IV. THE CRITICISM OF ACTIONS |
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70 | (18) |
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V. THE PSYCHOLOGY OF PLEASURE AND DESIRES |
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88 | (22) |
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1. Innate and Conditioned Dispositions to Like and Dislike |
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89 | (6) |
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2. Desire and Pleasant Experiences |
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95 | (3) |
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3. Direct Conditioning of Desires |
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98 | (2) |
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4. Other Basic Mechanisms? |
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100 | (3) |
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103 | (7) |
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VI. THE CRITICISM OF PLEASURES AND INTRINSIC DESIRES |
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110 | (20) |
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1. Some Types of `Mistaken' Desires, Aversions, or Pleasures |
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115 | (11) |
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2. Rational Desires and the Concept of the Intrinsically Good |
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126 | (4) |
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VII. SOME RATIONAL PLEASURES AND DESIRES |
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130 | (19) |
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1. Desires for What is Natively Liked |
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130 | (2) |
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2. Pleasure and Ethical Hedonism |
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132 | (6) |
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138 | (11) |
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VIII. THE FORCE OF KNOWING WHAT IS RATIONAL |
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149 | (14) |
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1. The Force of Knowing What is Rational to Do (Desires Taken as They Are) |
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152 | (2) |
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2. The Force of Knowing What it is Rational to Want |
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154 | (6) |
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3. Should One Act as if One's Desires were Rational? |
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160 | (3) |
| Part II |
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163 | (174) |
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IX. THE CONCEPT OF A MORAL CODE |
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163 | (20) |
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1. The Nature of a Social Moral System |
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164 | (12) |
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2. Moral Codes and Institutional Expectations |
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176 | (3) |
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3. Could a Universal Moral Code be Effective? |
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179 | (4) |
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X. JUSTIFICATION AND THE CONCEPT OF THE MORALLY RIGHT |
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183 | (17) |
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1. The Justification of Moral Codes |
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183 | (5) |
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2. The Concept of Choice of (Tendency to Support) a Moral Code |
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188 | (5) |
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3. The Definition of `Morally Right' |
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193 | (3) |
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4. A Possible Kantian Modification of the Definition |
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196 | (4) |
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XI. RATIONALLY PREFERRED MORAL CODES AND THE GENERAL WELFARE |
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200 | (24) |
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1. An Overview of the Choice Problem |
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200 | (3) |
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2. Types of Valenced Outcome Relevant to Support of a Moral System |
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203 | (5) |
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3. The Irrationality of Some Desires |
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208 | (4) |
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4. The Concept of a Viable Moral System |
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212 | (2) |
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5. Rational Choice and Utilitarianism |
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214 | (10) |
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XII. THREE DIFFERENT DERIVATIONS OF THE RIGHT |
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224 | (22) |
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1. The Ideal Observer Theory |
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225 | (4) |
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2. The Theory of R. M. Hare |
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229 | (5) |
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3. Choice Behind a Veil of Ignorance: the Theory of John Rawls |
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234 | (12) |
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XIII. WELFARE: THE CONCEPT, MEASUREMENT, AND INTERPERSONAL COMPARISONS |
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246 | (20) |
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1. The Objection to Desire Theories |
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247 | (6) |
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2. The Measurement of Happiness |
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253 | (4) |
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3. Interpersonal Comparisons of Enjoyment |
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257 | (9) |
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XIV. THREE MONISTIC MORAL CODES |
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266 | (20) |
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267 | (4) |
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271 | (7) |
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3. Utilitarian Generalization |
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278 | (8) |
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XV. THE CONCEPT OF A PLURALISTIC WELFARE-MAXIMIZING MORAL SYSTEM |
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286 | (20) |
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1. The Variable Features of Plural Moral Systems |
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287 | (2) |
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2. The Content of a Welfare-Maximizing Moral System |
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289 | (7) |
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3. Paradoxes for the Plural Ideal-Code Utilitarian? |
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296 | (4) |
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300 | (6) |
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XVI. JUSTICE, EQUALITY, AND THE MAXIMIZATION OF WELFARE |
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306 | (21) |
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1. The Problem about Justice |
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306 | (3) |
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2. A Welfare-Maximizing Principle about Allocations of Income and Goods |
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309 | (2) |
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3. Why Equal Monetary Income? |
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311 | (5) |
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4. Why Supplements for the Ill and Handicapped? |
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316 | (3) |
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5. Recompense for Services |
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319 | (8) |
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XVII. IS IT ALWAYS RATIONAL TO ACT MORALLY? |
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327 | (10) |
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1. The Concept of Self-Interest |
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328 | (3) |
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2. Would a Rational Person Ever Act Morally Contrary to Self-Interest? |
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331 | (6) |
| REFERENCES |
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337 | (18) |
| INDEX |
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355 | |