THE GREAT WAR (1914-1918)

Navy gunners, manning Navy guns on American merchant ships were sailing the war zone before the U.S. declared war. First to get into action, these armed guards had more than 200 encounters with submarines, many of them long-fought gun battles. First in service, they were first in sacrifice ... -Josephus Daniels, Secretary of the Navy

The dramatic story of the U.S. Naval Armed Guard Service (NAG) encompasses two world wars, in which it performed valiant and important service, but with such a lack of recognition that even today it is almost unknown. The arming of merchant ships by both Great Britain and the United States in World War I was brought about largely because of the unexpected and stunning success of a comparatively new weapon of war, the submarine. Although submersibles had been experimented with for many years and proven seaworthy by Simon Lake as early as 1897, neither the British Admiralty nor the German Naval High Command realized the full potential of the submarine in sea warfare. And across the Atlantic, U.S. Navy "battleship admirals" had shown no more foresight. Their considered opinion of the submarine was that it was no more than "a passing fad of a small group of wayward naval architects."

Just before the outbreak of war in August 1914, a British admiral, called to a conference on potential U-boat problems, declared positively, "Gentlemen, it is child's talk to say that U-boats will ever amount to anything! Disregard them entirely!" That confident assertion must have come home to haunt him; losses of Allied shipping were to mount at an astounding rate and skyrocket to over 6,000,000 tons in 1917, coming perilously close to knocking Britain out of the war before an effective system of convoying merchant shipping was belatedly adopted. Germany was also slow to realize the significance of U-boat warfare; U-boat commanders early on were given no orders to attack merchant shipping, but were merely told to select targets of opportunity. At the beginning of the war Germany had only about twenty boats, suitable mostly for short patrols and mine-laying. Nevertheless, this small force sank thirty-nine ships in less than three months. Germany began to build more submarines, but even in spite of their obvious successes, the effort was only half-hearted. On 1 January 1917 Germany had 133 U-boats, a year later only 144, a third of which were on station at a given time. Even so, the rate of sinkings increased steadily. In 1914 U-boats sank ships totaling 310,000 tons, in 1915 the toll rose to 1,301,000 tons, in 1916 to 2,322,000 tons, and in catastrophic 1917 losses rose to 6,270,000 tons.

Most of the merchant ship losses were of vessels traveling alone, easy prey for U-boats. Germany's seagoing ace, Commander Lothar von Arnauld de la Perrierre, sank fifty-four ships in less than one month in 1916. In what has been described by British historian Captain B.H. Liddell Hart as "Britain's blindest blunder of the war," the Admiralty firmly held to the belief that it was not necessary to provide protection for ordinary merchantmen, and actually thought that convoying would prove more dangerous to them. A convoy was likened to a flock of sheep, easier for a wolf to attack. There were other objections: it was feared that reducing the speed of a convoy to that of the slowest vessel would lose valuable time, and the arrival of a convoy at one port at one time would jam unloading facilities and cause additional delay in getting the goods where needed. It was strongly felt that merchant ships could not possibly steam in close formation and at the speed required and would thus cause collisions. The clinching argument was that the Royal Navy could not spare escort vessels, especially destroyers, which were felt to be more needed to protect and screen the Grand Fleet at home.

Junior officers at the Admiralty fought doggedly to change this policy, to no avail; one out of every four ships that left Britain did not return, and Britain's merchant fleet was being decimated. When Rear Admiral William S. Sims, USN, arrived in England to survey the situation in early 1917, Britain was down to food supplies for only six weeks, and Sir John Jellicoe, First Sea Lord, told Sims frankly, "It is quite impossible for us to go on with the war if losses like this continue ..." Winston Churchill later wrote, "In April 1917, the great approach route to the southwest of Ireland was becoming a veritable cemetery of British shipping."

Mounting pressure on senior officers of the Admiralty became so great that on 1 May 1917 they reluctantly agreed to go along with one experimental convoy, homeward-bound from Gibraltar. The success of that and a second experimental convoy brought about a complete change of policy, and the convoy system was soon expanded. A flotilla of American destroyers arriving in Ireland in early 1917, and operating under the command of a British admiral, assisted materially in reducing the losses of merchant vessels. By the end of 1917, the U-boat menace was largely overcome, and E. B. Potter, professor of naval history, U.S. Naval Academy, later wrote, "It is no exaggeration to state that adoption of convoy saved Britain from defeat in World War I."

The Admiralty was not the only naval command that blundered; it was not until 1918 that the German Naval High Command ordered priority construction of several hundred U-boats, to be delivered in 1919, but it was much too late. A Commodore Herman Bauer had recommended earlier that a command submarine be stationed off the Western Approaches, to coordinate U-boat operations by radio (as practiced so successfully by the Dönitz wolfpacks in World War II before Allied defenses became effective). Bauer was not only turned down, but he was relieved of command, and Germany lost its best opportunity to bring Britain to its knees before American participation changed the balance of scales.

The outbreak of war in 1914 was regarded by many Americans as "just another European war," and one that we should well stay clear of. President Woodrow Wilson enunciated U.S. national policy as absolute neutrality, "We must be impartial in thought, as well as in action," and he won a second term in 1916 on the slogan, "He kept us out of war." Both sides took actions that were offensive to the United States as a neutral; British search and seizure of American shipping was reminiscent of events leading up to the War of 1812. Wilson's personal physician, Rear Admiral Cary Grayson, USN, later wrote that Wilson was incensed at British actions. "At one time, if it had not been for the realization that Germany was the scourge of the world, he would have been ready to have it out with England ..." Resentment of British actions extended to the U.S. Navy Department. Chief of Naval Operations Rear Admiral William S. Benson told Rear Admiral Sims prior to his departure on his mission to England, "Don't let the British pull the wool over your eyes. It is none of our business pulling their chestnuts out of the fire. We would as soon fight the British as the Germans."

American public opinion shifted slowly in favor of the Allies, primarily because of the German policy of unrestricted submarine warfare, despite German claims that it had become necessary because of the arming of British merchant vessels and the use of "Q" ships, disguised armed freighters, that made it impossible for a submarine commander to determine if a ship were an ordinary unarmed merchantman or a man-of-war, capable of blowing his boat out of the water when its guns were run out. American resentment toward Germany flamed with the sinking of the British liner Lusitania off the coast of Ireland in May 1915, with the loss of 1,198 lives including 139 Americans. The "Lusitania Massacre," in effect, ended public debate in the United States on the relative merits of claims of Great Britain and Germany. Although Germany yielded to a virtual ultimatum by President Wilson and gave assurances that no liners would be sunk without warning and that some provisions would be made for the safety of noncombatants, the damage had been done. It was compounded by a fatal decision by the German High Command: in January 1917, at an official high-level conference at Pless, it was concluded that the resumption of unrestricted submarine warfare was the quickest and best way to bring Britain to its knees. It was a deliberate decision, with full understanding that it would bring America into the war, but with the calculation that the war could be ended before America's full power could be brought to bear. It was estimated that by sinking Allied shipping at the quite-possible rate of 600,000 tons per month, Britain would have to yield within no more than six months, and possibly as little as three. Therefore, on 31 January 1917, Ambassador Johann von Bernstorff informed Secretary of State Robert Lansing that, as of the next day, German submarines would sink on sight and without warning all merchant ships, including neutral vessels, entering its declared war zones.

The United States government severed diplomatic relations with Germany on 3 February, but did not go so far as to issue a formal declaration of war. On 26 February Wilson asked Congress for authority to arm merchant ships on grounds that since diplomatic means had failed there was "no recourse but armed neutrality"; the Armed Ship Bill was quickly passed by the House of Representatives, 403-13, but ran into serious opposition in the Senate, which blocked it by a filibuster after bitter debate. A furious Wilson then exercised his constitutional powers and directed the navy to furnish guns, ammunition, and gunners to American ships clearing for ports in Europe and passing through declared German war zones. The navy objected, declaring that the idea was "fundamentally fallacious" and arguing that such policy would deprive the navy of scarce manpower, guns, and ammunition, all of which would have to come from the fleet, but to no avail.

Following the navy's announcement that it was proceeding with arming merchant shipping, an official report was submitted to the department by Captain W. Pitt Scott, USN, who had been making a preliminary study of the problem. Dated 1 March 1917, his report covers a wide range of pertinent points: what vessels were to be armed, how to arm them, how to man the guns, rules for the conduct of merchant ships, rules for officers and men of the naval armed guard service assigned to duty on merchant vessels, and rules for masters of merchant vessels to which naval gun crews would be assigned. Captain Scott, who later became the organizer and chief operating officer of the Naval Armed Guard Section, recommended that armed guard crews at first be trained enlisted men of the navy, to be replaced later by specially trained men with short-term enlistments. He also recommended that no officers be assigned to the armed guard section-"... 668 men immediately needed, including 149 petty officers ... two guns should be supplied to each vessel, except larger vessels where four should be mounted, if supply permits." For all practical purposes, Captain Scott could be considered father of the U.S. Naval Armed Guard Service. His thorough and comprehensive report was in decided contrast to much of the conflict going on in official circles at the time.

On 2 April 1917, President Wilson addressed a joint session of Congress and delivered an eloquent speech in which he stated, "Armed neutrality it now appears is impracticable. The German Government denies the right of neutrals to use arms at all within areas of the sea it has proscribed ..."; he then called for a declaration of war on Germany, passed by Congress on 6 April 1917.

Prior to the declaration of war and for a short time after U.S. entry, the details of furnishing armed guards were handled by commandants of various navy yards, but it soon became evident that a central organization to provide administration and to supply the armed guards was necessary. A navy report dated 25 October stated, "The situation of having naval men associated on board a merchant vessel, under control of a merchant Master, is one without previous naval precedent ... a new feature of naval administration and has brought forth many new and interesting problems." It adds, "As it almost immediately developed that but little dependence could be placed on the merchant seamen to assist the AG in its special duty, the complement of AG has been made sufficient for a full gun's crew for each of the guns placed aboard, with sufficient additional men to provide an adequate and continuous lookout. Navy radiomen are also furnished on all vessels with Armed Guards." An earlier directive from the chief of naval operations stated, "It is desired, if practicable, without crippling the fleet personnel that at least one member of each guard be an expert signalman."

The very first action of the armed guard occurred just three days before the declaration of war against Germany. The SS Aztec , carrying the first AG crew consisting of one officer and twelve men, was torpedoed by a U-boat off the island of Ushant, and quickly went down by the bow. John J. Eopolucci of Washington was the first man of the American armed services to lose his life in service against Germany. A few days later, Lieutenant Charles C. Thomas, commanding officer of the armed guard unit aboard the SS Vacuum , was the first officer of the AG to lose his life, along with four of his men. More action soon followed. On 19 April a shot from the SS Mongolia scored a direct hit on the periscope of a German U-boat. On 12 June 1917, the SS Moreni was attacked and sunk by a U-boat, but put up such a good fight that it elicited praise from the submarine's commander. Chief Boatswain's Mate Andrew Copassaki was cited for his almost unbelievable performance in the defense of the ship. Also in June, the SS Norlina , out of Baltimore, was struck by a torpedo that failed to explode. The gun crew took full advantage of its new lease on life and scored a direct hit on the submarine's periscope, and a second hit either sank or disabled the submarine. Other ships that engaged the enemy were the SS Albert Watts and the SS John L. Luckenbach . The AG-manned ship that had the longest fight with the enemy was the SS Compana ; although finally captured and sunk by bombs placed aboard, the engagement with the U-61 in the Bay of Biscay on 16 August 1917 lasted four hours and ten minutes. A report on the fight and subsequent treatment aboard the submarine was written by Chief Gunner's Mate James Delaney. It was so detailed and colorful that it was sent to the secretary of the navy for his personal review.

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Excerpted from UNSUNG SAILORS by Justin F. Gleichauf Copyright © 1990 by United States Naval Institute
Excerpted by permission. All rights reserved. No part of this excerpt may be reproduced or reprinted without permission in writing from the publisher.