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Summary
Drawing on sources in Japanese, Chinese, and American archives and libraries, this book reassesses another facet of Woodrow Wilson's agenda at the 1919 Paris Peace Conference at the end of World War I. Breaking with accepted scholarly opinions, the author argues that Wilson did not "betray" China, as many Chinese and Western scholars have charged; rather, Wilson successfully negotiated a compromise with the Japanese to ensure that China's sovereignty would be respected in Shandong Province. Rejecting the compromise, Chinese negotiators refused to sign the Treaty of Versailles, creating conditions for the Soviet Union's entry into China and its later influence over the course of the Chinese revolution.
Table of Contents
| List of Maps | |
| List of Documents | |
| Acknowledgements | |
| Technical Note | |
| List of Abbreviations | |
| Introduction | |
| The Diplomatic Situation Prior to the Paris Peace Conference | |
| The German Diplomatic Position in Shandong | |
| Japan Declares War on Germany | |
| Strategic and Military Importance of the Shandong Concession | |
| Foreign Policy Issues Regarding the Shandong Concession | |
| Japan Presents the Twenty-one Demands | |
| The Japanese Ultimatum | |
| China Joins the War Against Germany | |
| The 1918 Secret Sino-Japanese Agreements | |
| Conclusions | |
| Notes | |
| The Chinese Delegation's Proposals to the Paris Peace Conference | |
| The Members of the Chinese Delegation | |
| Wellington Koo and President Woodrow Wilson | |
| The Chinese Delegation's Proposals to Paris | |
| Wellington Koo and the Shandong Question | |
| The Chinese Delegation's March and April Declarations | |
| Direct or Indirect Restitution of Shandong | |
| Conclusions | |
| Notes | |
| The Japanese Delegation's Proposals to the Paris Conference | |
| The Japanese Delegation and its Proposals | |
| The American Delegation's Opening Position on Shandong | |
| Who Wanted the Secret Agreements Kept Secret? | |
| The Impact of the Secret Agreements on America's Proposals | |
| The Japanese Delegation's April 1919 Proposals | |
| Conclusions | |
| President Wilson's Compromise Proposal | |
| The American Delegation and its Proposals | |
| The Big Three's Negotiations with the Chinese Delegation | |
| The Big Three's Negotiations with the Japanese Delegation | |
| Wilson's Rationale Behind this Compromise Solution | |
| The Impact of Wilson's Compromise | |
| Conclusions | |
| Notes | |
| The Myth of Woodrow Wilson's Betrayal | |
| The Importance of "Face" in China | |
| The Chinese Diplomatic Reaction to the Shandong Resolutions | |
| The Japanese Diplomatic Reaction to the Shandong Resolutions | |
| The Shandong Resolution, The May Fourth Movement, and Wilson | |
| Liang Qichao's Interpretation of the Shandong Resolutions | |
| Conclusions | |
| Notes | |
| Wilson's Failed Attempts to Secure a Japanese Statement of Intent | |
| American Decides to Obtain a Japanese Statement of Intent | |
| The Chinese Delegation Fails to Sign on a Provisional Basis | |
| The Creation of a Draft Statement of Intent | |
| Plans to Issue a Big Three Statement of Intent | |
| Shandong and the League of Nations | |
| Conclusions | |
| Notes | |
| Shandong and the Origins of the Chinese Communist Party | |
| The May Fourth Movement and Chinese Radicalization | |
| The Karakhan Manifesto and the Birth of Chinese Communism | |
| The Shandong Resolution's Impact on | |
| Shandong and the Founding of the Chinese Communist Party | |
| Shandong and the United Front Strategy | |
| Conclusions | |
| Notes | |
| The Myth of Soviet Equal Treatment of China | |
| Shandong and the Diplomatic Legacy of Versailles | |
| The 1921-1922 Washington Conference | |
| Soviet Diplomacy and the United Front Strategy | |
| Lev Karakhan's Secret Diplomacy and the CER | |
| The 1925 Restoration of Soviet-Japanese Diplomatic Relations | |
| Lev Karakhan and the Twenty-one Demands | |
| Conclusions | |
| Notes | |
| Epilogue: The Impact of the Shandong Question | |
| Notes | |
| 27 January 1919 Notes | |
| 28 January 1919 Notes | |
| 22 April 1919 Notes | |
| Bibliography | |
| Index | |
| Table of Contents provided by Ingram. All Rights Reserved. |
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